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The Market and the Community: Lessons from
California's Drought Water Bank
Brian E. Gray*
Introduction
Beginning in the early 1980s, the California Legislature enacted a
series of laws that were designed to facilitate and to promote the voluntary
transfer of water. In creating a "limited free market" for water, the Legislature
recognized that it would be necessary to consider alternatives to new
engineering projects to supply the state's burgeoning demand for water.
Foremost among these alternatives was the strategy of encouraging existing
water users to conserve water and to make the fruits of the conservation
available for some other use. Water transfers were a central feature of this
strategy, because the market both would offer price incentives for voluntary
conservation and would present existing users with the opportunity costs of
continuing their current, perhaps less than efficient, water use practices.1
Snowpack and precipitation were abundant during the early 1980s in
all areas from which California obtains its surface water. Consequently, few
users transferred water pursuant to the new transfer laws. As the 1980s
progressed, however, California fell into one of the most severe droughts in

*Associate Academic Dean and Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings
College of the Law. J.D., 1979 University of California at Berkeley; B.A, 1976, Pomona College.
I would like to thank Wendy Lou Manley for her excellent assistance in the research for
this article. I also extend my appreciation to those who reviewed earlier drafts of the
manuscript: Hap Dunning, Steve Macaulay, Walt Pettit, Bob Potter, Teresa Rice, Andy
Sawyer, Joe Sax, Buzz Thompson, and Gary Weatherford. Finally, I am grateful to the other
individuals cited in the footnotes, who were kind enough to provide their impressions and
criticisms of the 1991 Drought Water Bank.
This article was originally written as part of a multidisciplinary study of the Water Bank.
The fruits of this study will appear as "Sharing Scarcity: Gainers and Losers in California
Water Marketing" (Henry J. Vaux, Jr., Harold O. Carter, and Ann Foley Scheuring, editors),
which will be published by the Agricultural Issues Center and the Water Resources Center of
the University of California. A slightly different version of the article appears as chapters two
and six of this book. I thank Ann Scheuring, who edited the final versions on these chapters.
1. For a more detailed explanation of the purposes of California's water transfer laws,
see Brian E. Gray, The Modern Era in California Water Law, 45, HASTINGS L.J. 249, 273-78 (1994).
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the state's recorded history, and several large transfers of conserved and
surplus water took place.2 By the end of the decade, the cumulative effects of
the drought included acute supply shortages throughout the state and a
panoply of environmental problems.3 In response, Governor Pete Wilson
declared a state-wide water supply emergency in February 1991 and ordered
the Department of Water Resources to create an Emergency Drought Water
Bank. The Water Bank, which operated for two years, represents the first
significant test of California's modern water transfer laws.
This article analyzes the legal issues associated with the transfer of
water from users in Yolo and Solano Counties to the 1991 Water Bank.4 The
analysis is based in large part on the interviews with a number of the
participants in, and representatives of groups affected by these transfers.
From these interviews, six important questions have emerged:
(1) Were the existing water transfer laws, which authorize the transfer of
surplus water and water made available as a result of conservation,
adequate to facilitate the transfer of water to the Water Bank?
(2) Why did the State Water Resources Control Board have so little jurisdiction
over the transfers to the Water Bank, and did the Board's limited role
conform to the requirements of California law?
(3) Did the Department of Water Resources' acquisition of the benefits of water
held pursuant to riparian rights unlawfully circumvent the place-of-use
limitations of the riparian system?
(4) Should the transfers of the "base supplies" held by the Central Valley
Project "water rights settlement" contractors have been subject to the
transfer jurisdiction of the State Water Resources Control Board?

2. For a description of these transfers, see Brian E. Gray, Water Transfers in
California: 1981-1989, in 2 Lawrence J. MacDonnell, ed., The Water Transfer Process as
a Management Option for Meeting Changing Demand, Ch.2 (U. Colo. 1990).
3.

See infra Part I.A.

4. This article focuses on Water Bank operations during 1991 for two reasons. First, this
article was written as part of a larger multidisciplinary study of the Water Bank that began in 1992
and which relied heavily on data from the 1991 water year. By the time the study was completed,
final data from the 1992 Water Bank were not available. See supra note*. Second, a principal topic
of the article is the effects of water transfers on third-party interests in the areas from which water
was conserved and transferred to the Water Bank. The 1991 Water Bank included water made
available from land fallowing, while the 1992 Water Bank did not. Consequently, the 1991
transfers provided more useful data for analyzing the relationship between water transfers and
local economic, hydrologic, and environmental interests affected by the transfers. The article does
compare the 1991 and 1992 operations where appropriate, particularly in Part III which evaluates
changes in law and policy that have resulted from the state's experience in administering the 1991
Water Bank. For more information on the 1992 Water Bank, see CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER
RESOURCES, THE 1992 DROUGHT WATER BANK (1993).
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(5) Did the transfers of surface water made available by the transferor's
decision to use groundwater as a replacement source of supply comply with
the surface water transfer laws and the California Water Code's protections
of counties in which groundwater originates?
(6) Did the transfer process established by the Department of Water Resources
(a) protect the interests of the local areas from which water was exported
and (b) provide an adequate forum for consideration of potential
environmental effects of the transfers?

These questions overlap one another in many significant respects. For
example, the limited role played by the State Water Resources Control
Board (hereinafter "the Board") was largely the result of the Department of
Water Resources' (hereinafter "DWR") legal characterization of the surface
water that was transferred to the Water Bank. And, one consequence of the
Board's restricted jurisdiction was the elimination of existing legal
protections for third-party interests and for counties in which groundwater
originates. Thus, the analysis of these questions will dovetail, and the
answers to any one question inevitably will shape the answers to the others.
Along with the legal analysis, I will discuss whether the actions taken by the
participating agencies, though lawful (or at least legally justifiable), represent
salutary public policy. For example, the characterization of certain transfers in a
way that removed them from the regulatory jurisdiction of the Board undoubtedly
made it easier for the Department of Water Resources to acquire water for
distribution to areas of the state that were suffering from severe shortages. But is
it proper for agencies with paramount authority over California's water resources
to circumvent the statutory protections established by the Legislature for the
protection of groundwater reserves, fish and wildlife, instream flows, and the
interests of areas-of-origin? Thus, in addition to evaluating the legality of actions
that have long since transpired, I will suggest how California's water transfer laws
should be changed to incorporate the positive lessons of the 1991 Water Bank and
to redress the actions that were legally problematic or which inappropriately
favored some of the competing interests over others.
I.

A Brief Overview of the 1991 Water Bank
A.

The Cumulative Effects of the Drought

The 1991 Water Bank was created in response to an impending water
supply emergency in many areas of California caused by four consecutive
years of drought. Following a period of relative abundance during the early
1980s, capped by an officially "wet" year in 1986, California began an

43
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extended drought.5 Water years 1987 and 1988 were designated as "critical."
Conditions improved slightly in 1989, which as a result of unusually high
March precipitation in the Sierra Nevada ended up merely as a "dry" year. In
water years 1990 and 1991, however, precipitation and runoff returned again
to "critical" levels and the cumulative effects of the drought began to strain
both the economy and the environment of the state.6
In February 1991, storage in California's 155 largest reservoirs had
dropped to 54 percent of average, the lowest level since the 1976-1977
drought and the second lowest level since the state's major water supply
facilities were constructed.7 Storage in the State Water Project [hereinafter
"SWP"] was at an all-time low, standing at 884,000 acre-feet or only 18
percent of capacity.8 The Department of Water Resources estimated on
February 1 that inflow to Oroville Reservoir for the 1991 water year would be
only 1.54 million acre-feet, or 32 percent of historical average.9 Based on
these data, the Department announced on February 4 that it would deliver
only 10 percent of the water requested by State Water Project contractors for
municipal and industrial supply and no project water to agricultural users.10
Central Valley Project (hereinafter "CVP") water users faced only
slightly less dire prospects. CVP storage was 2 million acre-feet below
February 1990 levels and stood at 3.8 million acre-feet or 51 percent of

5. Statewide precipitation during the 1986 water year (October 1, 1985, through
September 30, 1986) was 128 percent of average and runoff exceeded the historical average by
40 percent. The Sacramento River Index (which estimates the unimpaired runoff in the
Sacramento River system above the city of Red Bluff, the flow of water from the Feather River in
Oroville Reservoir, the unimpaired flow of the Yuba River at the town of Smartville, and the
flow of the American River into Folsom Reservoir) was 25.7 million acre-feet or 6.8 million acrefeet greater than its fifty year average to that date. In addition to these annual supplies, of
October 1, 1986, reservoir storage stood at 199 percent of average. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
WATER RESOURCES, CALIFORNIA'S CONTINUING DROUGHT 1987-1991: A SUMMARY OF IMPACTS AND
CONDITIONS AS OF DECEMBER 1, 1991, at 2, (1991) [hereinafter 1991 DWR REPORT].
6.

Id.

7. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, THE 1991 DROUGHT WATER BANK 1
(1992) [hereinafter 1992 DWR REPORT].
8. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S DROUGHT ACTION TEAM 8 (1991)
[hereinafter DAT REPORT]. The Department of Water Resources also had access to
250,000 acre-feet of water in groundwater conservation storage. Id.
9.

Id.

10. 1992 DWR REPORT, supra note 7, at 1. The only exception was for contractors
in the Feather River service area, who have water rights settlement agreements with
the state that recognize their pre-project water rights. DWR announced that these
users would receive 50 percent of their normal contract supplies. Id.
44
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historical average.11 The Bureau of Reclamation estimated that the runoff
into CVP reservoirs would be 1.3 million acre-feet less than in water year
1990.12 In response to these forecasts, the Bureau announced in February
1991 that deliveries to urban and agricultural users would receive only 25
percent of normal contract supplies, and other CVP contractors that have
special status because of their pre-project water rights—the Sacramento River
Water Rights Settlement Contractors and the San Joaquin River Exchange
Contractors—would receive 75 percent of their contract entitlements.13
Regional water supply agencies were similarly affected by the continuing
drought. The Hetch Hetchy Project, which supplies water to San Francisco and
thirty other cities and water agencies on the San Francisco Peninsula, had
only 400,000 acre-feet of stored water on February 1, compared with normal
storage of one million acre-feet. Snowpack in the Tuolumne River watershed
above Hetch Hetchy Reservoir was virtually nonexistent and "[p]rospects for
additional inflow [were] not promising."14 As a result of the projected supply
deficiency, the San Francisco Water Department imposed mandatory water
rationing, requiring its wholesale and retail customers to reduce consumption
by 25 percent from 1986 levels.15 In Southern California, the Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power projected that it would be allowed to take
only 130,000 acre-feet from the Owens Valley and Mono Basin, approximately
25 percent of normal exports.16 To compensate for the supply deficiency, Los
Angeles proposed to make full use (100,000 acre-feet) of its groundwater from
the Metropolitan water District.17

11.

DAT REPORT, supra note 8, at 9.

12.

Id.

13. 1992 DWR REPORT, supra note 1, at 1. Interestingly, within the Friant Unit of
the CVP, deliveries to Class I contractors were not reduced at all, although no water
was available for Class II uses. 1991 DWR REPORT, supra note 5, at 19.
14.

DAT REPORT, supra note 8, at 9.

15.

Id.

16.

Id. at 12.

17. Id. Although at that time Metropolitan Water District's [hereinafter "MWD"]
projected supply from the SWP was only 10 percent of normal, see supra text accompanying note
10, at 4. The Secretary of the Interior had informed MWD that it would be receiving a nearly
normal supply from the Boulder Canyon Project. The Seven-Party Agreement apportioning
Colorado River Water among the California recipients provides that MWD's maximum annual
entitlement at fourth and fifth priorities is 1,154,000 acre-feet. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER
RESOURCES, CALIFORNIA WATER: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, BULLETIN 160-87, 28 (1987). Despite three
years of drought in the Colorado River basin, accumulated storage in the system allowed the
Secretary to promise deliveries of at least 4,886,000 acre-feet to all California users, including
1,024,000 acre-feet to MWD. DAT REPORT, supra note 8, at 12.
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By 1991, most agricultural users with access to groundwater had increased
their pumping to compensate for the shortages in surface water supplies.18 The
number of new well drilled rose to an all-time high of 24,000 in 1990, and
significant groundwater overdraft was reported throughout the eastern San
Joaquin Valley and in the Tulare Basin.19 According to the Department of Water
Resources, groundwater depletion in these areas from 1987 to 1991 exceeded 11
million acre-feet.20 There were also reports of subsidence in both areas, and
overdraft-induced groundwater pollution problems were found in Kings and
Kern Counties.21 By February 1991, the state predicted that a significant number
of wells would go dry by the end of the year along the North Coast, in the
eastern Sierra Nevada, and in the Central Valley foothills.22
Despite the increased use of groundwater, substantial shortages
existed in most regions of the state. The agricultural areas expected to be
most adversely affected were "the Central Coast, the west side of the
Southern San Joaquin Valley, and western Yolo County."23 Following the
announcement of reductions in SWP and CVP deliveries, there were reports
that more than one million acres of farmland would be without surface
water.24 The state predicted that "over 100,000 acres of trees and vines in the
southern San Joaquin Valley . . . will be endangered . . . unless enough water
is transferred to save them."25
A number of municipal water supply agencies had adopted mandatory
water rationing programs. These agencies included the Marin Municipal Water
District, the San Francisco Water Department, the Santa Clara Valley Water
District, the City of Santa Barbara, and the City of Los Angeles.26 Most other
major urban water agencies had either called for voluntary reductions in
consumption or were considering mandatory rationing.27 The Metropolitan
Water District adopted a price incentive system that was designed to induce its
member agencies to reduce demand by 31 percent on a system-wide basis.28

18.

1992 DWR REPORT, supra note 7, at 16.

19.

Id. at 18.

20.

1991 DWR REPORT, supra note 5, at 16.

21.

Id.

22.

DAT REPORT, supra note 8, at 17-19.

23.

Id. at 15.

24. Carl Ingram & Marla La Ganga, U.S. Water for State Farmers is Cut by 75 percent,
L.A. TIMES (quoting Jason Peltier, Manager, CVP Water Assn.), Feb 15, 1991. at 3. 36.
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DAT REPORT, supra note 8, at 14.

26.

Id. at 16.

27.

Id.

28.

Id. at 18.
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Cities served by the SWP and the CVP were "concerned about severe
water reductions."29 These included towns in Shasta County, the San Juan
Suburban Water District in Sacramento County, Yuba City, cities in southern
Alameda and Santa Clara Counties served by the South Bay Aqueduct and
San Felipe Project, and cities in Solano County, such as Benicia and Vallejo,
which depend on water from the North Bay Aqueduct for virtually their
entire water supply.30 And, as of February 15, 1991, ten counties—
Mendocino, Sonoma, Marin, Glenn, Colusa, Sutter, Yuba, Madera, Tulare,
and Santa Barbara—had declared water shortage emergencies.31
The drought also had adverse consequences for fish, wildlife, riparian
vegetation, aquatic habitat, wetlands, and a variety of other natural
resources, as well. The state reported in February 1991 that "[s]ubstantial
reductions in stream flow requirements below dams have been in effect for
the last four years," and "[s]treams dependent on unregulated flow are at
seriously low levels."32 As a result of the diminished riparian habitat, fish and
wildlife throughout California were "undergoing severe stress."33 A variety of
fish species were particularly vulnerable. For example, the 1990 fall run of
Chinook salmon returning to the Sacramento River numbered about 15,000,
which was the lowest recorded population.34 The 1991 Chinook salmon
winter run—which is listed as a "threatened" species under the Endangered
Species Act-was even worse. Only 191 adults returned to spawn, down from
441 in 1990 and approximately 20,000 in 1981.35 Striped bass may have
suffered the most dramatic declines.36 The adult population of striped bass
also reached an all-time low in 1991 of 515,000.37
In addition, the drought had contributed to the loss of about one-third
of the timber in the Sierra Nevada, and tree mortality statewide stood at 8
billion board feet, approximately two and one-half times the normal
amount.38 Fuel and fire conditions were at hazardous levels, and droughtweakened forests were highly susceptible to insect infestation.39 The state

29.

Id. at 15.

30.

Id.

31.

Id. at 20-21.

32.

Id. at 16.

33.

Id.

34.

1991 DWR REPORT, supra note 5, at 31.

35.

Id. at 31,33.

36.

Id. at 32.

37.

Id.

38.

DAT REPORT, supra note 8, at 33.

39.

Id.
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also reported that "[n]atural wetlands have dried up and managed wetlands
will receive only very limited allocations for 1991."40
B.

Creation of the Water Bank

In response to these problems, Governor Wilson issued an executive
order on February 1, 1991, which created a "Drought Action Team" comprised
of the Secretary of the California Resources Agency and the directors of
various other state and federal agencies.41 The Governor directed the group to
coordinate the state's response to the drought and to recommend a course of
action to mitigate its predicted effects on domestic water supply, agriculture,
and the environment during the upcoming year. On February 15th, the
Drought Action Team issued its first report, recommending among other
action that the Department of Water Resources establish either a
clearinghouse to facilitate the transfer of water between willing buyers and
sellers or a "Water Bank" through which the Department itself would purchase
water for resale to areas of California suffering from supply shortages.42
The Governor chose the latter alternative and created the 1991 Drought
Water Bank. According to the Drought Action Team, the Water Bank would, "in
effect, create a pool of available water. This would then be made available for
urban agencies with critical needs, for critical agriculture needs, fish and wildlife
and for carryover storage for next year."43 At the outset, it was recognized that
"[g]iven the nature and extent of the drought, there are only a few areas that
may have water to sell."44 The Drought Action Team noted that sellers would
have to be "fairly compensated for sharing available resources" and would
require assurances that participation in the Water Bank would not jeopardize
their water rights.45 Two alternative means of acquiring water were proposed:
One would involve simply paying a farmer for his water which would
result in fallowing of land this year. The other is to pay a farmer to
switch from stream diversion to the use of groundwater. In either case,
the water would be made available for immediate sale and use or held
in Oroville, Clair Engle, or Shasta reservoir[s] for sale at a later date.46

40.

Id. at 16.

41. Governor of California, Exec. Order No. W-3-91 (1991); see DAT REPORT,
supra note 8, at iv.

48

42.

DAT REPORT, supra note 8, at 28.

43.

Id.

44.

Id.

45.

Id. at 28-29.

46.

Id. at 28.
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The Drought Action Team emphasized that time was of the essence. "Potential
sellers are largely Central Valley farmers who are now making crop decisions;
potential buyers are cities and farmers who need to make immediate
decisions to cope with severely limited water supplies."47 Accordingly, the
State Water Resources Control Board promised to expedite consideration of
all petitions to engage in a temporary transfer of water to the Bank.48
C.

Operations of the 1991 Water Bank

Immediately following the Drought Action Team's report, the
Department of Water Resources created a "Water Purchase Committee"
comprised of representatives of potential buyers and sellers. The
Committee's tasks were to negotiate the terms of a model contract for water
bank transfers, to establish a uniform price for the water acquired by the
Bank, and to estimate the amount of water that would be offered for sale
and demanded by potential purchasers at that price.49
Establishment of a "fair and workable price" was one of the most
difficult and time-consuming issues faced by the Water Purchase
Committee.50 Although the Department of Water Resources has stated that
"the value to the potential user had to be considered" in establishing the
purchase price for water transferred to the Bank,51 the opportunity cost to
potential sellers of not transferring water was the dominant factor in the
Water Purchase Committee's pricing calculus. The committee began with the
assumption that most of the water transferred to the water bank would come
from the fallowing of rice, corn, and wheat in the lower Sacramento Valley
and the Delta. "The intent was to offer a price that would yield a net income
to the farmer similar to what the farmer would have earned from farming
plus an additional amount to encourage the farmer to enter into a contract
with a new and untried water bank."52 At the same time, both DWR and the
Governor expressed a strong desire to prevent sellers from earning excessive
profits by charging higher prices based on individual buyers' willingness to
pay.53 Thus, "[a]fter taking a detailed look at farm budgets, talking to
potential sellers and buyers, and getting advice from agricultural economists

47.

Id. at 29.

48.

Id.

49.

1992 DWR REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.

50.

Id. at 5.

51.

Id.

52.

Id.

53.

See Eric Brazil, State "Water Bank" Tap Looks Dry, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 28, 1991, at 7.
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and others knowledgeable about crop and water use," DWR set the purchase
price for water transferred to the Water Bank at $125 per acre-foot.54
The Water Bank entered into 351 contracts for the purchase of 821,045
acre-feet of water.55 Participating sellers provided water from three different
sources: (1) surface water conserved as a result of fallowing land that the
seller otherwise would have irrigated; (2) surface water made available by
the seller's decision to use groundwater in its place; and (3) surface water
previously stored by the seller that was in excess of the seller's projected
needs for the water year.56
Three hundred twenty-eight of the contracts, accounting for 50 percent
of the purchased water, were "fallowing contracts" by which the sellers were
paid not to irrigate crops.57 Fifty-nine percent of the 166,093 acres fallowed

54. 1992 DWR REPORT, supra note 7, at 5. The standard form transfer contracts also included a
"price escalator clause," which was designed to induce potential sellers to participate in the water
bank early in the process, rather than waiting for a higher price in the event that water conditions
worsened and market factors drove up the contract price. RICHARD HOWITT, ET AL., A RETROSPECTIVE ON
CALIFORNIA'S 1991 EMERGENCY DROUGHT WATER BANK 10 (1992) (hereinafter "HOWITT REPORT").
Under the clause, if the average price paid similarly-situated sellers in contracts
executed by a specified future date exceeded by 10 percent the price specified in
the contract, then the seller would receive the higher price. If the average price
paid similarly-situated sellers was less than the contract price, the seller would
still receive the (higher) price specified in the contract.
Id. at 10-11.
Initially, DWR was criticized for setting a price that many perceived to be substantially below
the true market price for water. See e.g. David Newdorf, The Scramble for Water, S.F. RECORDER, Mar.
4, 1991, at 1. Representatives of the Sacramento Valley rice growers stated, for example, that the
$125 per acre-foot by the Water Bank was only about one-third of the price that they would be
willing to accept to fallow their land. See Sabin Russell, Protests on "Water Bank" Prices, S.F. CHRONICLE,
Mar. 9, 1991, at 1. Ultimately, few rice growers participated in the Water Bank. 1992 DWR REPORT,
supra note 7, at 4. As events transpired, however, the price of water fell in the months after the
creation of the Water Bank. Although the Bank paid $125 per acre-foot to all participating sellers,
[l]ate in the year, the SWP negotiated contracts for the purchase of 10,000 acrefeet at $50 per acre-foot and 10,000 at $30 per acre-foot. The price reduction
reflected the more favorable water supply and demand conditions. Among the
factors contributing to the improved conditions were the ample March rains, a
mild summer, and the remarkable success of the Water Bank and urban water
conservation measures.
Id. at 5.
55.

HOWITT REPORT, supra note 54, at 10.

56.

Id. at 10-11.

57. Id. The term "fallowing contract" is a bit of a misnomer, because the contracts
prohibited only the irrigation of land subject to the contract. Thus, consistently with the
50
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were located along the lower Sacramento River and in the Delta.58 Of this land,
40,206 acres were in Yolo County and 18,551 acres were in Solano County.59
This represented 12 percent of the acreage irrigated during the preceding five
years in Yolo County and approximately 10 percent of the estimated crop
value. For Solano County, the fallowed land represented less than 10 percent
of the irrigated acreage, but 18 percent of the estimated crop value.60
DWR established a "crop fallowing payment schedule," which listed the
estimated amount of applied water consumed by each of the fallowed crops.61
These estimates ranged from a high of 3.5 acre-feet per acre for rice, alfalfa, and
pasture in the Sacramento Valley and Delta Upland, to a low of 1.0 acre-feet per
acre for grain in the Sacramento Valley and Delta.62 Along with promising not to
irrigate crops during the 1991 growing season, farmers who participated in the
fallowing program also agreed to eliminate weeds and other vegetation that
would consume significant quantities of water.63 The contracts also provided
that sellers who irrigated land that they had agreed to fallow, would be liable for
liquidated damages of double the price paid for the fallowing.64
Nineteen contracts, amounting to 33 percent of the water sold to the
Bank, were for what DWR has characterized as "groundwater."65 Under these
contracts, the sellers "agreed to pump groundwater to irrigate crops and

contract, the seller could plant any crop that would not require irrigation. "Grain, pasture,
and alfalfa were allowed if irrigation was withheld for the entire season. Land intended for
corn, tomatoes, and other annual crops was left fallow. Asparagus was allowed if the crop
was plowed under." 1992 DWR REPORT, supra note 7, at 7.
58.

HOWITT REPORT, supra note 54, at 10.; 1992 DWR REPORT, supra note 7, at 4.

59.

1992 DWR REPORT, supra note 7, at 4.

60.

HOWITT REPORT, supra note 54, at 18.

61.

Id. at 11.

62. Id. The "estimate crop consumptive use" was equal to the crop's
evapotranspiration under the assumption that rainfall during the 1991 growing
season would be equal to that of the 1977 growing season. Because the actual
rainfall for 1991 exceeded these projections, however,
DWR reduced its estimates of crop water need for certain crops such as
wheat and grain. For example, before March 1, DWR estimated that
grain would consume 2.0 af/acre of applied water. With the unusually
heavy March rains, DWR reduced the estimates to 1.5 af/acre after March
1, and finally to 1.0 af/acre by March 13.
Id. at 12.
The fallowing contracts were based on the estimated consumptive use at the
time each agreement was executed. Id. For a complete list of the estimated
consumptive use for each crop involved in the 1991 Water bank, see id. at 13.
63.

Id. at 11.

64.

Id.

65.

1991 DWR REPORT, supra note 7, at 8.
51
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allow [the] surface water they normally used to be transferred to the Water
Bank."66 The usual arrangement was for the seller to use its own wells to
obtain the groundwater and for the seller's water district to "release an equal
amount of its surface supply to the Bank."67 In a few cases, accounting for
less than 10,000 acre-feet, the seller directly transferred groundwater to the
Water Bank.68 DWR reviewed construction records for each of the
participating seller's wells in order to ensure that the groundwater pumped
in lieu of the transferred surface water was not taken from the river and
therefore represented a "new" source of supply to the surface water system.69
Nevertheless, "[c]oncerns were expressed that groundwater might be
pumped for use outside the basin."70 DWR responded to these concerns by
including in the contracts for purchase of "groundwater" from Butte, Yolo, and
Yuba Counties the requirement that the sellers establish groundwater
monitoring programs to measure both the quantity of groundwater pumped and
the effects of the increased withdrawals on the groundwater table.71 In addition,
the Yolo County Board of Supervisors limited the amount of groundwater that
could be pumped as a substitute for transferred surface water to the seller's
maximum use during the ten preceding years. The County also received from
each seller two percent of the seller's gross revenues from the transfers to the
Water Bank. DWR agreed to reimburse the sellers for 50 percent of their
monitoring expenses up to a fixed limit and for all of the seller's costs of making
the two percent gross receipts payment to the County.72
The balance of the water transferred to the Water Bank—approximately
17 percent of the total supplies—was obtained through four contracts for
the purchase of previously stored water that was surplus to the projected
needs of the transferors.73 Of the 139,580 acre-feet of stored water, 129,200
acre-feet was acquired from the Yuba County Water Agency, which was a
source of supplemental water throughout the 1987-1992 drought.74 The
contract with Yuba County provided for the release of 99,200 acre-feet to the
Water Bank in 1991, with the remaining 30,000 to be stored in New Bullards
Bar Reservoir on behalf of DWR for release in 1992.75 In addition, Yuba
County agreed to transfer another 28,000 acre-feet to DWR for distribution to
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66.

Id.

67.

HOWITT REPORT, supra note 54, at 12.

68.

1992 DWR REPORT, supra note 7, at 8.

69.

Id.; HOWITT REPORT, supra note 54, at 12.

70.

1992 DWR REPORT, supra note 7, at 8.

71.

HOWITT REPORT, supra note 54, at 12.

72.

See infra part II.E(1).

73.

1992 DWR REPORT, supra note 7, at 8.

74.

HOWITT REPORT, supra note 54, at 10; see Gray, supra note 2, at 12.

75.

HOWITT REPORT, supra note 54, at 13.
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the Department of Fish and Game.76 The price for water transferred to the
Water bank was $125 per acre-foot. The price for water transferred to the
Department of Fish and Game was $50 per acre-foot.77
DWR offered to sell water acquired by the Water Bank to "any corporation,
mutual water company, or public agency . . . that had responsibility to supply
water for agricultural, municipal and industrial, fish and wildlife, or other used in
California in 1991."78 In accordance with the Drought Action Team's
recommendation that water held by the Water Bank should be allocated for the
purpose of "firming up urban supplies to minimum levels, meeting critical
agricultural uses, preservation of fish and wildlife, and carryover storage for
1992,"79 however, the Department established a set of priorities to guide its
selection of purchasers. These priorities, listed in order, were:
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

Emergency needs, such as related to health and safety.
Areas with critical needs, which DWR defined as "urban users with less
than a 75 percent water supply; agricultural users who needed water to
assure survival of permanent or high-value crops; and fish and wildlife
resources."
"Other critical needs, such as water to meet critical needs for the first
few months of 1992, until next year's water supplies are known and
available."
Additional supplies for Water Bank participants that purchased water for
critical needs and which "need additional supplies to reduce substantial
economic impacts resulting from reduced water supplies."
Carryover storage for the State Water Project.80

Eighteen water agencies initially joined the Water Bank as potential
purchasers by submitting "estimates of critical needs" on April 1, 1991. 81 Twelve
of these agencies ultimately entered into contracts to purchase 389,970 acrefeet of water from the Bank.82 The discrepancy between the 821,045 acre-feet

76.

Id.

77.

Id.

78.

Id. at 5.

79.

DAT REPORT, supra note 8, at viii.

80.

1992 DWR REPORT, supra note 7, at 9.

81.

HOWITT REPORT, supra note 54, at 7, Table 1.

82. Listed from north to south, the 12 purchasing agencies were:
Agency
Acre Feet
American Canyon County Water District..............................370
Contra Costa Water District ................................................6,717
San Francisco Water Department.....................................50,000
Alameda County Water District........................................12,800
Alameda County Food Control and
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acquired by the Water Bank and the 389,970 allocated to the twelve purchasers
is the result of two factors. First, there are significant carriage losses incurred
when water is transported through the Delta for diversion at Clifton Court
Forebay. These carriage losses, which usually amount to approximately 20
percent of the water moved through the Delta, were only about 14 percent of the
water transferred through the Delta pursuant to the 1991 Water Bank.83 Second,
the heavy and unexpected March rains decreased demand, particularly for "noncritical" uses. As a result, DWR retained approximately 250,000 acre-feet of the
acquired water as carryover storage for 1992.84 Indeed, given the various
uncertainties—the amount of water that would be offered for sale to the Water
Bank, the amount of water that would be requested for allocation from the Bank,
whether a market-clearing price would be established, and the unpredictability
of the weather—is was essential that DWR stand ready to purchase the surplus
water remaining in the Water Bank at the close of the 1991 water year.
The base purchase price for water was $175 per acre-foot.85 This
reflected the $125 per acre-foot cost of acquiring the water plus $45 per acrefoot for carriage losses and technical corrections and administrative

Water Conservation District...................................................500
Santa Clara Valley Water District .....................................19,750
Oak Flat Water District ...........................................................975
Westlands Water District...................................................13,820
Dudley Ridge Water District..............................................13,805
Kern County Water District ...............................................53,797
Crestline-Lake Arrowhead Water Agency .............................236
Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California...........................................................................215,000
1992 DWR REPORT, supra note 7, at 6.
83. According to DWR, of the 821,045 acre-feet acquired by the Water Bank,
[a]pproximately 165,000 acre-feet was subtracted due to Delta carriage
water requirements and technical corrections . . . For the 1991 Drought
Water Bank, [carriage losses] were calculated to be 14 percent, a
melded overall rate which reflected the various specific sources of
water for the Bank. The technical corrections were in two components.
The first component was an after-the-fact fine tuning of the crop
consumptive use numbers between the Department and the Bureau of
Reclamation. The second component was a correction for actual
rainfall, which resulted in a decrease of about 30,000 acre-feet from the
total purchased amount. This left a net of about 655,000 acre-feet of
water that could be delivered, which was apportioned 390,000 acre-feet
to meet critical water needs of the buyers, and 265,000 acre-feet for
State Water project carryover storage.
Letter from Robert G. Potter, Chief Deputy Director, California Department of Water
Resources 2 (Sept. 8, 1993) (on file with author).
84. HOWITT REPORT, supra note 54, at 63. For a more detailed explanation of how
DWR allocated water to the participating agencies, see id. at 5-10.
85.
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expenses of $5 per acre-foot.86 Most of the water was delivered through SWP
facilities. Buyers who used these facilities also paid for the operation and
maintenance costs incurred by DWR in delivering the water. Purchasers that
were not SWP contractors also paid a "use of facilities fee, which was a
proportional share of the capital and annual costs associated with SWP
facilities used to make the transfer."87
Although the reduced diversions and retention of water sold to the
Water Bank provided some benefits to Sacramento River fisheries and other
instream uses,88 the increased pumping of water from the Delta for delivery
to the Water Bank's customers had threatened Delta water quality and
posed serious problems for several species of fish. Initially, DWR and the
Bureau of Reclamation proposed to lessen the ambient water quality
standards for chlorides at three locations in the Delta—Rock Slough, the
CVP Tracy Pumping Plant, and Clifton Court Forebay.89 The parties withdrew
their petition, however, when the unexpected March rains provided the flows
needed to achieve the existing Delta water quality standards.90 Nevertheless,
because five years of drought had "already placed the Delta in a vulnerable
condition," the State Water Resources Control Board asked DWR to prepare
an evaluation of the effects of Water Bank transfers on Delta fisheries.91 From
this study, DWR determined that increased pumping from the Delta
associated with the Water Bank would increase the entrainment losses of
American shad, Delta smelt, and striped bass, particularly during the
months of June, July, and August.92 Accordingly, DWR decided to withdraw
water from storage in San Luis Reservoir to fulfill its contract obligations to
the Water Bank purchasers south of that facility, and to defer the increased

86. Letter from Robert G. Potter, Chief Deputy Director, California Department
of Water Resources 2 (Sept 8, 1992) (on file with author). "[T]he Delta carriage water
requirement is a quantity of additional water needed as Delta outflow to maintain
compliance with Delta water quality standards for a given increase in export
pumping under conditions of reverse flow in the western Delta." Id.
87.

Id.

88.

See infra text accompanying notes 209-10.

CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, NOTICE OF EMERGENCY PUBLIC
HEARING AND BOARD MEETING: CONSIDERATION OF DROUGHT-RELATED EMERGENCY WATER RIGHT ORDER
AND RELATED ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR A HEARING FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF WATER
RESOURCES, ACTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED (1991); see CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES,
DELTA PROTECTIONS: EFFECT OF TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS OF WATER RIGHT PERMITS 8-9 (1991).
89.

90.

1992 DWR REPORT, supra note 7, at 10.

91.

Id.

92. Memorandum from Randall H. Brown to Larry Gage: Fish Impacts of Water
Bank Delta Transfer, California Department of Water Resources (July 3, 1991)
[hereinafter "Fish Impacts Memorandum"] (on file with author).
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diversion of water from the Delta until September and October.93 DWR then
replaced the water taken from San Luis Reservoir in the summer with the
water diverted from the Delta during the fall months.94
D.

Evaluations of the Water Bank

By virtually all accounts, the 1991 Water Bank was a success. According
to DWR, the Bank "is an example of what can be created with
resourcefulness and cooperation. Over 800,000 acre-feet of water was
developed in a short time because all of the participants were committed to
the program's success."95 Moreover, the "large-scale water transfer program
was implemented in less than 100 days with the help of the entire water
community, and important links with local water interests and local
government were established for future programs."96
Outside observers have been equally complimentary. An influential
analysis of the Water Bank concludes that while "not everyone was
supportive of water banking, the consensus was that the Bank was
successful, particularly given the emergency circumstances under which it
was created . . . DWR staff, especially those leading the Bank's management,
were singled out by a number of participants for high praise."97 The
interviews conducted for this study confirm this conclusion.98
II.

A Legal Analysis of the 1991 Water Bank

The 1991 Water Bank achieved the primary purpose for which it was
created—to reallocate developed water supplied on a short-term basis from
users who either could do without or had alternative water sources to users
located in other areas of California for whom continued shortages
threatened severe hardship. As DWR has observed, because of the existence
of the Water Bank, the implementation of "stringent conservation practices,
plentiful March rains, and a mild summer, conditions that could have been
disastrous in some areas were made bearable."99
Yet, the transfer of water to areas with critical supply deficiencies was only
one of several goals set forth by the Drought Action Team in its report to the
Governor recommending the formation of a Water Bank. These other goals were:
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93.

1992 DWR REPORT, supra note 7, at 10.

94.

Id. at 11.

95.

Id. at 19.

96.

Id.

97.

HOWITT REPORT, supra note 54, at 21.

98.

See infra part II.E-F.

99.

1992 DWR REPORTsupra note 7, at 19.
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Protection of the water rights of transferors of water to the Water Bank.
Preservation of fish and wildlife.
Mitigation of the effects of transfer on third-parties.
Recognition of county-of-origin and area-of-origin laws.100

In marked contrast with the successful transfer of water to areas of critical
need, it is far less clear whether the Water Bank fulfilled these other policies
and promises. Indeed, while the interviews conducted for this paper confirm
the conclusion that the administrators of the Water Bank undertook a
Herculean task with alacrity and sensitivity for the interest of the counties
from which the water was transferred and other third-parties affected by the
transfer, several critical legal decisions were made that reduced the probability
that the last three of the Drought Action Team's goals would be achieved.
As the remainder of this paper will show, through both existing laws
governing water transfers and special legislation enacted to encourage
transfers to the Water Bank, DWR was able to provide iron-clad guarantees
to transferors that the sale of water to the Bank would not in any way
jeopardize their water rights. Yet, because the transfers of water to the Bank
overwhelmingly involved surface water held pursuant to riparian right and
surface water for which groundwater was substituted, both the State Water
Resources Control Board and the laws that establish a process for protecting
third-party water rights holders, fish and wildlife, instream flows, and other
interests within the areas-of-origin were effectively removed from the
transfer process. Moreover, because of the decision legally to characterize
the transfers for which groundwater was substituted as transfer of surface
water for one purpose and transfers of groundwater for another, the laws designed
to protect the counties in which groundwater originates were circumvented.
As explained below, all of these legal decisions may have been justifiable
under the perceived emergency conditions that existed at the time the Water
Bank was established and the transfer contracts written. But they raise troubling
questions about the efficacy of laws enacted to balance the interests of water
users who participate in the market and the interests of those who are not
parties to the transfer contracts that formed the Water Bank.
A.

The Legal Backdrop

An essential prerequisite to the 1991 Water Bank was the enactment
over the preceding twelve years of legislation that encourages voluntary
transfers of water by explicitly authorizing the sale of conserved and surplus
water and by protecting the water rights of users who choose to transfer
water to others. The surface water transferred to the Water Bank was held
pursuant to five types of rights: riparian rights; pre-1914 appropriative rights;

100.

DAT REPORT, supra note 8, at viii-ix.
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riparian and pre-1914 appropriative rights now embodied in CVP contracts
with the United States Bureau of Reclamation; permitted or licensed
appropriative rights administered by the State Water Resources Control
Board; and entitlements to water based on the user's membership in a local
water agency. Each of these categories is subject to different legal rules
regarding nonuse and forfeiture.
For the riparians, including the CVP water rights settlement
contractors, participation in the Water Bank posed little risk, because
riparian rights may not be lost or diminished by nonuse.101 Therefore, the
decision to forego water for one growing season would not jeopardize the
transferors' future water rights.102
Because appropriative rights can be lost by nonuse,103 the Legislature
enacted a statute in 1979, which declares the conservation and transfer of
water to be a beneficial use and that prohibits the forfeiture of the water not
used as a result of these practices. Section 1011 of the Water Code permits
an appropriator to reduce its water use through the implementation of
conservation measures and to retain full rights to the conserved water. The
statute defines conservation broadly as "the use of less water to accomplish
the same purpose or purposes of use allowed under the existing
appropriative right."104 Moreover, water saved as a result of "land fallowing or
crop rotation" qualifies under the statute as "conserved water."105 According
to subsection (a), the "cessation or reduction in the use of such
appropriated water shall be deemed equivalent to a beneficial use" of the
conserved water.106 Subsection (b) then authorizes the sale, lease, or
exchange of the conserved water, subject to the general water transfer

101.

In re Waters of Long Valley Creek System, 25 Cal. 3d 339, 357-358 (1979).

102. For the participating riparians, the most significant legal questions was whether they
could transfer their water to the Bank without violating the riparian land and watershed limitation
of the riparian rights system, see, Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327 (1907). The way
in which the DWR avoided these problems is discussed below in Part II.C. The CVP water rights
settlement contractors had the additional problem of persuading the Bureau of Reclamation that
at least the water rights settlement portion of their contracts should be transferable under the
provisions of California law and not be subject to the Bureau's restrictions on transfers of "project"
water. This problem will be analyzed in part II.D.
103. California Water Code § 1241 provides that appropriative rights held pursuant
to permit or license are subject to forfeiture if the water is not beneficially used for a
period of five years and that "such unused water may revert to the public and shall, if
reverted, be regarded as unappropriated water." CAL. WATER CODE § 1241 (West Supp.
1994). Pre-1914 appropriative rights also may be forfeited if the water is not beneficially
used for a period of five years. Smith v. Hawkins, 110 Cal. 122, 127 (1895).
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CAL. WATER CODE § 1011(1) (West Supp. 1994).
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laws.107 The Legislature sought to guarantee the water rights of appropriators
who conserve and transfer water pursuant to this section by declaring that
"[n]o forfeiture of the appropriative right to the water conserved shall occur
upon the lapse of the [applicable] forfeiture period."108
Several other provisions of the Water Code address the rights of
individuals who do not themselves own water rights, but instead receive their
water from a local water agency. Section 382 declares that "[n]otwithstanding
any other provision of law, every local or regional public agency authorized by
law to serve water to the inhabitants of the agency may sell, lease, exchange, or
otherwise transfer water that is surplus to the needs of the agency's water users
for use outside the agency."109 Section 383 then defines "surplus water" in three
different ways. Subsection (a) authorizes the agency to transfer water "which the
agency finds will be in excess of the needs of water users within the agency for
the duration of the transfer."110 Subsection (b) permits the transfer of water
conserved by individual users within the agency where the agency, rather than
the user, holds the water right.111 Subsection (c) authorizes the transfer of
conserved water by individual users within an agency who hold their own water
rights. It provides that "the water user and the agency [may] agree, upon
mutually satisfactory terms, that the water user will forego use for the period of
time specified in the agreement" with the transferee and directs that the agency
"shall act as agent for the water user to effect the transfer."112 Transfers made
pursuant to these provisions are subject to the general transfer laws, including
the requirement that any change in the point of diversion, place of use, or
purpose of use set forth in the transferor's permit or license be approved by the
State Water Resources Control Board.113
Although these sections of the Water Code do not contain the same type
of "anti-forfeiture" guarantees provided by section 1011, they are subject to

107. Id. § 1011(b), As discussed below, the other transfer laws grant the State
Water Resources Control Board jurisdiction over all transfers of surface water held
pursuant to a permit or license that require a change in the point of diversion, place
of use, or purpose of use set forth in the permit or license. Transfers of groundwater
and of surface water held pursuant to a riparian or pre-1914 appropriative right are
categorically exempt from this aspect of the Board's jurisdiction. See infra part II.B.
108.

CAL. WATER CODE §1011(a) (West Supp.1994).

109.

Id. § 382(a).

110.

Id. § 383(a).

111.

Id. § 383(b).

112.

Id. § 383(c).

113. Id. §§ 384 & 386; see infra Part II.B. In addition, before engaging in a transfer to users
served by another water agency, the transferor must obtain the consent of the "recipient" agency.
CAL. WATER CODE § 385 (West Supp. 1994). Inasmuch as all of the transfers were to the Water Bank
for redistribution to the participating purchasing agencies, this requirement posed no problems.
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section 1244 of the Code, which establishes a general protection of the water
rights of persons or agencies that transfer water. Section 1244 declares:
The sale, lease, exchange, or transfer of water or water rights, in itself,
shall not constitute evidence of waste or unreasonable use,
unreasonable method of use, or unreasonable method of diversion
and shall not affect any determination of forfeiture applicable to
water appropriated pursuant to the Water Commission Act or this
code or water appropriated prior to December 19, 1914.114
Taken together, these statues "afford potential transferors a
reasonable assurance . . . that by offering water for sale, entering into
negotiations, or conducting studies of potential conservation yields
within their service areas, they will not lose their water rights. Neither
the transfer nor the negotiations leading up to the transfer may be
used as evidence that the transferor's [water] rights exceed its actual
reasonable needs.115
Thus, of all the problems faced by DWR in the days leading up to the
formation of the Water Bank, the issue of least consequence should have
been the fear that by participating in the Bank sellers would subject their
water rights to the risk of forfeiture of divestment based on waste or
unreasonable use. Yet, in hearings conducted in January 1991, the State
Water Resource Control Board "heard testimony that some water users may
be afraid to transfer water for fear of prejudicing their water rights."116
Consequently, to assuage any lingering doubts about the legal effects
of selling water to the Water Bank, the Legislature convened an
"Extraordinary Session" in March and April 1991 to enact special transfer
legislation to encourage transfers to the Bank.117 Two of these statutes are
germane to this analysis. Both laws expired on January 1, 1993.
Assembly Bill No. 9, sponsored by Assemblyman Cortese, authorized
any water supplier to transfer water to the Water Bank or to users outside
the water supplier's service area if two requirements were satisfied:

114.
115.
(1989).
116.

CAL. WATER CODE § 1244 (West Supp. 1994).
Brian E. Gray, A Primer on California Water Transfer Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 745, 774
DAT REPORT, supra note 8, at 29.

117. 1991 Cal. Stat. ch. IX-5X. Because the Legislature declared these acts to
be "urgency statute[s] necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace,
health, or safety within the meaning of Article IV of the [California] Constitution,"
they took effect immediately upon the Governor's signature. See id. ch. IX § 9.
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1. "The governing body of the water supplier determines
that it is in the best interest of the water supplier to
transfer the water."
2. "The water supplier has allocated to the water users
within its service area the water available for 1991 and no
user will receive less than the amount provided by that
allocation without that user's consent."118
The statute covered the types of transfers to the Water Bank that DWR
was in the process of negotiating. It applied only to water made available by
conservation or use of an alternative source of supply and to water
"developed pursuant to a contract by a water user to reduce water use below
the user's allocation or to eliminate the use of water during 1991, including
a contract to grow crops without the use of water from the water supplier, to
fallow land, or to undertake other action to eliminate water use."119 The law
also provided that a participating water supplier could transfer water to the
Water Bank "whether or not the water proposed to be transferred is surplus
to the needs within the service area of the water supplier."120
Assembly Bill No. 10, authored by Assemblyman Costa, was designed
to protect the water rights of those who sold water to the Water Bank. It
provided simply that "[n]o temporary transfer of water made pursuant to any
provision of law for drought relief in calendar years 1991 and 1992 shall
affect any water rights."121
The Department of Water Resources has stated that the "Drought
Water Bank probably would not have gotten off the ground as quickly as it
did had it not been for [these] two key pieces of legislation."122 This is
probably an accurate assessment of AB 9's authorization of transfers of
water that is not necessarily surplus to the needs of other users within the
service area of the transferor. As one attorney noted at the time, under the
circumstances, there was "no way that the board [of directors of a water
district] could make a declaration there are water surpluses."123 The new

118.

Id. ch. IX, §1.

119.

Id. ch. IX, § 2.

120.

Id. ch. IX, § 3.

121.

Id. ch. 2X, § 1(a).

122.

1992 DWR REPORT, supra note 7, at 15.

123. David Newdorf, The Scramble for Water, S.F. RECORDER, Mar. 4, 1991, at 1 (quoting
Edward Tiedemann). On the other hand, § 383(c) of the Water Code already authorized the
transfer of water that individual users choose (with the water agency's consent) not to use. CAL.
WATER CODE § 383(c). (West Supp. 1994). Section 383 defines this water as "surplus"
notwithstanding the claims of other members of the agency. Id. § 383; see supra text
accompanying notes 110-12. A water agency's board of directors therefore could make a
declaration that "surplus water" existed within the agency, which could be transferred to the
61
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legislation thus resolved the vexing legal question whether nonparticipating member of a local water agency could claim water that the
agency or another member proposed to conserve and transfer to users
located outside the agency.124
At first blush, it is difficult to agree with the Department's conclusion
that AB 10 was necessary to the creation of the Water Bank. As noted above,
existing law already provided that the decision to conserve or to transfer
water could not be used as evidence of unreasonable use and that, following
a transfer, all rights revert to the transferor. Yet, statutes do not always alter
human behavior in the way in which the Legislature intended, and there
remained in early 1991 a widespread belief that participants in the Water
Bank would incur a substantial risk of forfeiting their rights to the water
offered for sale. In the words of the Manager of the Water Bank, "Water users
were still apprehensive. Our conclusion was tied to perceptions of prospective
sellers, who felt more assured after [AB 9 and AB 10 were enacted] and thus
were more willing to sell.125 An attorney who represented a number of
transferors to the 1991 Water Bank, and who helped to draft many of the
transfer statutes discussed in this section, confirms this analysis. In his
discussions "with growers in water districts to encourage participation in the
water bank," he observes, "there was a tremendous concern about water
rights protection. The more statutes you could show them the more it seemed
to help. So that was an important aspect of the special legislation."126
The temporary statues were useful, perhaps even essential, to the creation
of the 1991 Water Bank, because they provided the last measure of transfer
authority and water rights protection that participating farmers and water
agencies needed to convince them to sell some of their supplies to the Bank.
For this reason, the Legislature has made the provisions of the Assembly Bills 9
and 10 permanent features of California water transfer law.127

Water Bank. The real problem, however, was that the legal definition of surplus water under §
383 did not correspond with the common understanding of the term "surplus." For this reason,
although Assembly Bill 9 did not significantly change the legal powers of the water agencies, it
did clarify their water transfer authority as a practical matter.
124. See Brian E. Gray, Bruce c. Driver & Richard W. Wahl, The Transferability of Federal
Reclamation Water: A Case Study of California's San Joaquin Valley, 21 ENVTL. L. 911, 972-76 (1991).
125. Letter from Steve Macaulay, Manager of the Drought Water Bank, California
Department of Water Resources (Jan. 6, 1993) (emphasis in original) (on file with author).
126. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL ISSUES CENTER AND WATER RESOURCES
CENTER, CALIFORNIA WATER TRANSFERS: GAINERS AND LOSERS IN TWO NORTHERN COUNTIES 60
(1992) (hereinafter "U.C. CONFERENCE REPORT") (comments of Paul M. Bartkiewicz).
127.

1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 481, § 1. This statute provides:

A water supplier may contract with a state drought water bank or with any other
state or local water supplier or user inside or outside the service area of the
water supplier to transfer, or store as part of a transfer, water if the water
62
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The Jurisdiction of the State Water Resources Control Board

Although the State Water Resources Control Board is the principal
regulator of surface water use in California, none of the transfers of water
from Yolo and Solano Counties to the 1991 Water Bank were reviewed by the
Board. Indeed, of the 351 contracts to sell water to the 1991 Water Bank,
only two—those with the Yuba County Water Agency and the OrovilleWyandotte Irrigation District—were subject to the Board's jurisdiction.128

supplier has allocated to the water users within its service area the water
available for the water year, and no other user will receive less than the amount
provide by that allocation or by otherwise unreasonably adversely affected
without that user's consent.
CAL. WATER CODE § 1745.04 (West Supp. 1994). The water that may be transferred pursuant to §
1735.04 is defined as (1) stored water, (2) water that is made available by "[c]onservation or
alternate water supply measures taken by individual water users of by the water supplier"; and (3)
water that is "developed" pursuant to a contract "to reduce water use below the user's allocation
or to eliminate the use of water during the water year." Id. § 1745.05. The last category includes
contracts "to grow crops without the use of water from the water supplier, to fallow land, or to
undertake other action to reduce or eliminate water use." Id. § 1745.05(a)(2). Thus, the statute
expressly recognizes the types of contracts used by DWR in the 1991 Water Bank. However, it
limits the amount of water that may be transferred as a result of land fallowing to 20 percent of
the water that would have been "applied or stored" by the water supplier during any hydrological
year in the absence of a contract under §§ 1745.04 and 1745.06, unless the water supplier
approves a larger percentage following a public hearing. Id. § 1745.05(b).
The statute authorizes the transfer of water under § 1745.04 "whether or not the water
proposed to be transferred is surplus to the needs within the service area of the supplier." Id. §
1745.06. §§ 1745.04 and 1745.06 state that members may not make such claims to water that has
already been allocated to the transferor member (or which the local agency has stored and
thereby reserved form allocation), unless the objecting members can prove that they would be
"unreasonably adversely affected" by the proposed transfer. Id. §§1745.04, 1745.06.
The new law declares that transfers of water made pursuant to § 1745.04 "or any
other provision of law" are beneficial uses of water and shall not "cause a forfeiture,
diminution, or impairment of any water rights." Id. § 1745.07. These declarations are
reiterative of §§ 1011 and 1244 of the California Water Code. See supra text accompanying
notes 95-00 & 104-5. The Legislature also specified that landowners within a local water
agency who are also on the agency's board of directors may enter into water transfer
contracts with the agency. CAL. WATER CODE § 1745.03 (West Supp. 1994); U.C. CONFERENCE
REPORT, supra note 126, at 60. (comments of Paul M. Bartkiewicz). Finally, the AB 2897
established criteria for the transfer of surface water for which groundwater is substituted.
These provisions will be discussed in infra part II.E.
128. Telephone interview with Steve Macaulay, Manager of the Drought Water Bank,
California Department of Water Resources (Aug. 8, 1992); Telephone interview with Walter
Pettit, Executive Director of the State Water Resources Control Board (Aug. 14, 1992).
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This rather startling situation is the product of two factors. First, much of the
water transferred to the Bank from Yolo and Solano Counties is held
pursuant to riparian right or pre-1914 appropriative right. These rights are
categorically exempt from the Board's permitting and licensing authority
and from its jurisdiction over changes in water rights.129 Second, the
Department of Water Resources, with the acquiescence of the State Water
Resources Control Board, characterized the remaining transfers in a manner
that avoided the jurisdiction that the Board does have over changes in
permitted and licensed appropriative rights.
Under the existing water transfer laws, the Board must approve all
transfers of surface water appropriated pursuant to a permit or license
issued by the Board where accomplishment of a transfer requires a change
in the point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use set forth in the
transferor's permit or license.130 Two groups of transferors to the 1991 Water
Bank fall into this category.
First, many of the transferors located along the Sacramento River
receive their water under contracts with the United States Bureau of
Reclamation.131 The Bureau supplies these contractors with water it
appropriates at the Shasta and Trinity units of the Central Valley Project
pursuant to permits issued by the State Water Resources Control Board.132
Because these contractors held riparian and pre-1914 appropriative rights
that predated the construction of the CVP, their contracts with the Bureau
recognize their pre-project rights as a "base supply."
The Bureau of Reclamation allowed the CVP water rights settlement
contractors to transfer their base supplies to the 1991 Water Bank. In
acquiring this water, DWR determined that the water rights settlement
contractors' base supplies are legally equivalent to the riparian and pre-1914
appropriative rights that the contractor held before the CVP was
constructed. Based on this legal characterization of the CVP base supplies,
the Department argued that the transfers were exempt from the Board's
jurisdiction because the transfers involved riparian and pre-1914
appropriative rights, rather than water held by the Bureau under permits

129.

CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1201, 1706 (West 1971); see Gray, supra note115, at 768.

130. CAL. WATER CODE § 1701 (west 1971); see also id. § 1435 (West. Supp. 1994)
(temporary urgency changes); id. § 1723 (temporary changes—one year or less); id. §
1735 (long-term transfers—more than one year).
131. Telephone interview with Steve Macaulay, Manager of the Drought Water
Bank, California Department of Water Resources (Aug. 8, 1992); Telephone interview
with Neil W. Schild, Assistant Direction of the Mid-Pacific Region of the United
States Bureau of Reclamation (Aug. 10, 1992).
132. CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RIGHTS BOARD, WATER RIGHT DECISION 990 (1961); see United
States v. State Water Resources Control Board, 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 106 (1st Dist. 1986).
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issued by the Board.133 These transfers should have been subject to the
Board's jurisdiction, because the transfers (1) altered the riparian and pre1914 appropriative rights of the CVP water rights settlement contractors and
(2) changed both the point of diversion and place of use set forth in the
Bureau's permits. The Board did not assert jurisdiction over transfers of CVP
water to the Water Bank, however, because it failed to focus on these legal
issues at the time it approved the CVP transfers.134
Second, excluding water used under riparian right and water supplied
by the Bureau of Reclamation pursuant to the water rights settlement
contracts, the remainder of the water transferred to the Water Bank from
Yolo and Solano Counties is appropriated pursuant to permits of licenses
granted by the Board. According to the statutes described above, these
transfers would seem clearly to have fallen within the Board's jurisdiction.
All of these transfers were accomplished, however, by the substitution of
groundwater as a replacement for the surface water sold by the transferor.135
On the basis of this substitution of supply sources, DWR characterized these
transfers as sales of groundwater, rather than surface water.136 As such, the
transfers were outside the Board's jurisdiction.137
Taken together, these legal characterizations of the water sold to the
Water bank reduced the role of the State Water Resources Control Board
almost to nothing. Indeed, because all of the transfers to the Bank from Yolo
and Solano Counties involved water held under riparian right, pre-1914
appropriative rights, CVP "base supply", or permitted or licensed
appropriative rights for which groundwater was substituted,138 these legal
decisions removed the Board completely from the process of evaluating the
effects of the Water Bank transfers on the two counties. The consequence of
this effort to remove as many of the surface water transfers as possible from
the Board's jurisdiction was to exempt most of the operations of the Water
bank from a variety of laws enacted to protect third-parties from harm.
The Water Code authorizes the Board to approve "temporary changes"
in permits and licenses, which it defines as a change in the point of
diversion, place of use, or purpose of use "due to a transfer or exchange of
water or water rights if the transfer would only involve the amount of water

133. Telephone interview with Steve Macaulay, Manager of the Drought Water
Bank, California Department of Water Resources (Aug. 8, 1992); see infra part III.D.
134.

See infra part II.D.

135. Telephone interview with Steve Macaulay, Manger of the Drought Water Bank,
California Department of Water Resources (Aug. 8, 1992); Telephone interview with Walter
Pettit, Executive Director of the State Water Resources Control Board (Aug. 14, 1992).
136.

Id.

137.

See infra part II.E.

138. Telephone interview with Bob Aldridge, Drought Water Bank, California
Department of Water Resources (Aug. 8, 1992).
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that would have been consumptively used or stored by the permittee or
licensee in the absence of the proposed temporary change."139 Before the
Board may grant the petition, it must make both of the following factual and
policy determinations:
(1) The proposed temporary change would not injure any legal
user of water, during any potential hydrological condition,
through resulting significant changes in water quantity, water
quality, timing of diversion or use, consumptive use of the water,
reduction in return flows, or reduction in the availability of water
within the watershed of the transferor.
(2) The proposed temporary change would not unreasonably
affect fish, wildlife, or other instream beneficial uses.140
The statutes that govern transfers of conserved and surplus water
contain similar directives and also require the Board to determine that the
transfer would not "unreasonably affect the overall economy of the area from
which the water is being transferred."141 These laws represent the only
specific statutory protections for third-parties that are potentially affected by

139. CAL. WATER CODE § 1725 (West Supp. 1994). The law defines "consumptively
used" as "the amount of water which has been consumed through the use of
evapotranspiration, has percolated underground, or has been otherwise removed from use
in the downstream water supply as a result of direct diversion." Id. A "temporary change" is a
change in the "point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use" associated with a transfer
or exchange of water "for a period of one year or less." Id. Sec. 1728.
140. Id. § 1727(a). The board is authorized to make these findings without conducting
a public hearing. Following a determination that the proposed temporary change would not
violate either of the criteria set forth in the text, the Board must notify the petitioner and the
criteria set forth in the text, the Board must notify the petitioner and the third-party legal
users of water identified in its consideration of the petition that it has approved the petition.
The temporary change then becomes effective five days after the Board's order of approval is
issued. Id. § 1727(b). If its own evaluation of the available information about the potential
effects of the proposed temporary change does not enable the Board to make both findings
within 60 days following receipt of the notice, however, it must conduct a noticed public
hearing on the proposal. Id. § 1727(c). The Board's decision to subject to judicial review by
writ of mandate. Id. § 1730. Temporary changes are exempt from the requirements of the
California Environmental Quality Act (CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000 et seq.). Id. § 1729.
141. Id. § 386. The Board has not yet evaluated a proposed transfer under this
provision, because no one who has applied to transfer water under the conserved and surplus
water transfer statutes, Id. §§ 380-387. Telephone interview with Andrew H. Sawyer, Assistant
Chief Counsel to the State Water Resources Control Board (Mar. 1, 1993).
66

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

water transfers.142 Thus, if the laws are not invoked, there is no formal
process for evaluating the effects of a proposed transfer on other water
rights holders, fish and wildlife, instream uses, and other interests of the
area from which the water will be transferred.143
C.

Transfers of Water Held Pursuant to Riparian Right

As noted above, because riparian rights are not subject to the Board's
permit and license jurisdiction, changes in the exercise of such rights also
are exempt from the Board's authority.144 Thus, the transfers to the Water
Bank of water held under riparian right do not raise questions concerning
the Board's regulatory jurisdiction. Rather, these transfers present the more
fundamental question of whether DWR violated the general limitation of the
riparian system that prohibits the use of water held under riparian right on
non-riparian land and on land that is not within the watershed-of-origin.145
For all of the water held pursuant to riparian right that was sold to the Water
Bank was transferred out of the Sacramento River and Delta watersheds to
the South Bay, to the San Joaquin Valley, and to southern California.146
The administrators of the Water Bank dealt with this legal difficulty in a creative
and convincing way. According to DWR, the riparians who sold to the Bank did not
transfer water, because to do so would violate the proscriptions of non-riparian and
out-of-watershed use. Rather, the riparians simply agreed not to divert the water that
they normally would have used, which left that water in the Sacramento River and
Delta channels unclaimed by any water rights holder. DWR then took advantage of the
unused water for the purpose of meeting its obligations to maintain Delta water
quality.147 This made available SWP water stored in Oroville Reservoir for use in the

142.

See Gray, supra note 155, at 771-79.

143. The ways in which DWR did consider and attempt to protect third-party interests,
in the absence of formal review of these issues by the Board, is the subject of part II.F.
144. There are two exceptions. First, riparian rights that are quantified in a statutory
adjudication, see e.g., In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System, 25 Cal. 3d 339 (1979), are
transferable under the Temporary Change and Long-Term Transfer sections of the California
Water Code described above. CAL. WATER CODE § 1740 (West Supp. 1994). Second, California
Water Code Sec. 1707 authorizes all water right holders, including riparians, to dedicate all or a
portion of their rights to instream uses "for purposes of preserving or enhancing wetlands habitat,
fish and wildlife resources, or recreation in, or on, the water." Id. § 1707. Dedications made
pursuant to this section require the approval of the State Water Resources Control Board. The
Board may grant the petition only if the change: (a) will not increase the amount of water the
petitioner is entitled to use, and (b) will not "unreasonably affect any legal user of water." Id.
145.

See Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327 (1907).

146.

1992 DWR REPORT, supra note 7, at 6; HOWITT REPORT, supra note 51, Table 3.

147. See CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, WATER RIGHTS
DECISION 1485: SACRAMENTO-SAN JOAQUIN DELTA AND SUISUN MARSH (1978).
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Water Bank. In other words, the Water Bank did not purchase water from the riparians.
Rather, DWR acquired the benefits of water left in stream by the participating riparians'
decision to forego the exercise of their riparian rights.148
The way in which the Department of Water Resources arranged for the transfer
of riparian rights was "[p]erhaps the most innovative" aspect of the operation of the
Bank.149 As manager of the State Water Project, DWR is responsible for releasing
water from Oroville Reservoir or reducing its diversions at Clifton Court Forebay as
necessary to comply with the salinity standards established by the Board in its 1978
Salinity Control Plan and accompanying water rights decision.150 To comply with the
Delta water quality standards, DWR is not required to release a specific quantity of
water. Rather, the Department must augment the flow of water from the Sacramento
River system into the Delta when the combined flow from all sources is inadequate
to meet the standards. Thus, if other water users along the Sacramento River or in
the Delta may reduce their diversions, and thereby allow more water from the
Sacramento River system to flow into the Delta, DWR's obligation to release water
from Oroville Reservoir to comply with the Delta water quality standards is
concomitantly reduced. This in turn permits DWR to retain more water in storage or
to move additional water through the Delta for diversion at Clifton Court Forebay.
In buying from riparians on the Sacramento River and in the Delta the
promise not to divert surface water, DWR was able to accomplish the twin
objectives of complying with the Delta water quality standards while having
more water available for distribution within the SWP system or to the other

148. Telephone interview with Steve Macaulay, Manager of the Drought Water
Bank, California Department of Water Resources (Aug. 8, 1992); Telephone interview
with Walter Pettit, Executive Director of the State Water Resources Control Board
(A8g. 14, 1992). For a description of the characterization of the transfer of water held
pursuant to riparian right, see HOWITT REPORT, supra note 54, at 15-17.
149.

HOWITT REPORT, supra note 54, at 15.

150. CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, WATER QUALITY PLAN: SACRAMENTOSAN JOAQUIN DELTA AND SUISUN MARH (1978); CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD,
WATER RIGHTS DECISION 1485; SACRAMENTO-SAN JOAQUIN DELTA AND SUISUN MARSH (1978); see United
States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 111 (1st Dist. 1986). The Bureau
of Reclamation, as operator of the Central Valley Project, is jointly responsible for compliance
with the Delta standards. In 1986, California and the United States agreed conjunctively to
operate the SWP and the CVP to comply with the Delta standards. Agreement Between the
United States of American and the State of California for the Coordinated Operation of the
Central Valley Project and the State Water Project, Pub. L. No. 99-546, 100 Stat. 3050 (1986). The
Board revised the ambient water quality standards for the Delta in 1992. CALIFORNIA STATE WATER
RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, WATER QUALITY CONTROL PLAN FOR SALINITY: SAN FRANCISCO
BAY/SACRAMENTO-SAN JOAQUIN DELTA ESTUARY (1991). It also proposed to extend the obligation to
implement those standards to other major users of water from the Sacramento-San Joaquin River
and Delta system. CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, WATER RIGHTS DECISION 1630:
SAN FRANCISCO BAY/SACRAMENTO-SAN JOAQUIN DELTA ESTUARY (1993) (final draft).
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purchasers from the Water Bank. By acquiring only a promise by the
riparians to forego their own uses, rather than purchasing the water itself,
DWR gained the use of more of its own water while avoiding the problem of
transferring riparian water to non-riparian land for out-of-watershed uses.
Normally, the fatal flaw in such a strategy is that, because the water
foregone by the riparians legally "returns to the river," it is available for
diversion by other riparians downstream. Consequently, the purchaser runs
the risk that it will not be able to claim the water—or, in this case, the
benefits of the water—because it will be diverted and used by more senior
water rights holders. The strategy employed by the administrators of the
Water Bank worked, however, because they were able to acquire promised
from enough of the riparian rights holders along the lower Sacramento River
and in the Delta that the risk of substantial claims on the water foregone by
the participating riparians and "sold" to the Water Bank was minimal.151
Indeed, Water Bank officials acknowledged that the strategy likely would
have failed had it been employed upriver in the Sacramento basin without
the participation of downstream riparians, because the lower riparians could
have claimed the water ostensibly "acquired" by the Water Bank.152
Four conclusions may be drawn from the Water Bank's successful
acquisition of the benefits of water held under riparian right. First, this
creative, but rather awkward strategy was necessary to permit the Water
Bank to purchase water from Sacramento River and Delta riparians. For if
DWR had engaged in the more straightforward approach of simply
purchasing water from riparian landowners, the contracts would have been
illegal under the well-settled principles of riparian rights law.
Second, DWR's strategy of acquiring water, or the benefits of water, for
the purpose of conjunctively managing the purchased water with its own
supplies is a salutary feature of the Department's administration of both the
SWP and the Water Bank, because the purchases increased the operational
flexibility of the project. Indeed, in this respect, the acquisition and use of
the benefits of foregone riparian rights closely resembles DWR's pre-1991
water transfer contracts with the Yuba County Water Agency in which the
Department acquired water from New Bullard's Bar Reservoir. DWR used
this water to comply with the Delta water quality standards, while
simultaneously retaining more SWP water in Oroville Reservoir for release
later in the year for delivery to SWP contractors.153
Third, the purchase of a promise from lower Sacramento River and
Delta riparians to forego the exercise of their own riparian rights was

151. Telephone interview with Steve Macaulay, Manager of the Drought Water Bank,
California Department of Water Resources (Aug 8. 1992); Telephone interview with Bob
Aldridge, Drought Water Bank, California Department of Water Resources (Aug. 8, 1992).
152.

Id.

153.

See Gray, supra note 2, at 16-21.
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essential to the success of the 1991 Water Bank. As noted previously,
approximately 50 percent of the water sold to the Bank was made available
by the fallowing of riparian land. 154 Moreover, acquisition of these riparian
rights assured the administrators of the Water Bank that the water they
acquired upriver—in this case, predominantly from surplus storage and from
groundwater exchanges—would actually make it through the Delta for
diversion at Clifton Court Forebay for delivery to the Water Bank customers.
By purchasing the lion's share of the riparian rights along the lower
Sacramento River and in the north Delta, DWR was able both to reduce the
risk that the water purchased from upstream users would be claimed by
downstream riparians and to enhance its ability to calculate the carriage
losses incurred in transporting the purchased water through the Delta.
Fourth, the fact that the administrators of the Water Bank were able to
establish a workable method of estimating the amount of water previously
used by the participating riparians, which then became the basis for
quantifying the "rights" that the riparians could sell to the Water Bank,155 is
good evidence that riparian rights can be included in the water transfer
system. Although there were some objections to DWR's decision to
purchase water from riparian rights holders, which was based on the concern
that it would be impossible to accurately quantify each riparian's prior water
use,156 the experience with the 1991 Water Bank supports the legislative
proposals to permit the transfer of water by riparians.157
D.

Transfers of Water Supplied by the Central Valley Project

As noted previously, the water supply negotiations between the
Bureau of Reclamation and the CVP contractors that transferred water to the
Water Bank create two types of water service. The "base supply" represents
the pre-project rights of the contractor. This water is now supplied pursuant
to CVP contract in recognition of the substantial control that the CVP

154.

HOWITT REPORT, supra note 54, at 10, Figure 2.

155. The Water Bank administrators' method of estimating the amount of
water previously used by riparians later became the basis fro qualifying the "rights"
that the riparians could sell to the Water Bank. Id.
156. The Bureau of Reclamation strongly voiced this objection, although it
ultimately allowed its water rights settlement contractors to transfer their base
supply, which includes their pre-CVP riparian rights, to the Water Bank. Telephone
interview with Neil W. Schild, Assistant Director of the Mid-Pacific Region of the
United States Bureau of Reclamation (Aug. 10, 1992).
157. See e.g., A.B. 2090, 1991-92 Reg. Sess. § 15 (sponsored by Assemblyman
Richard Katz, which proposed to direct the Board to study the feasibility of allowing
the transfer of riparian water rights, including an assessment of how the Board
"would quantify the amounts of water available for transfer").
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exercises over the flow of water in the Sacramento River. In addition to the
base supply, many CVP contactors along the Sacramento River also receive
"project water." This represents the contractor's entitlement to water
supplied by the CVP in excess of the contractor's pre-project water rights.158
On February 14, 1991, the Bureau notified its Sacramento River contractors
that, because of the continuing drought and the low storage levels in Shasta and
Trinity Reservoirs, they would be subject to the reduction in water deliveries
applicable throughout the CVP system. The Bureau informed the water rights
settlement contractors that they would receive 75 percent of the sum of the "base"
and "project" supplies.159 Subsequently, a number of these contractors decided to
sell water to the Water Bank and sought permission from the Bureau to transfer
their supplies. Pursuant to its 1991 water transfer guidelines, the Bureau
authorized the water rights settlement contractors to sell a portion of their base
supply to the Water Bank, but refused to permit the transfer of any of the project
water component of the contractor's supply to be transferred for use outside the
CVP system.160 Because many of the Water Bank customers were non-CVP
contractors, this policy effectively prevented the sale of project water to the Bank.
The Bureau used its own formula to calculate the amount of each
contractor's base supply that could be transferred to the Water Bank. Each
water rights settlement contractor could transfer the lower of 75 percent of
its base supply or the average of the high three years of historical use from
1980 through 1989.161 This is in marked contrast with the manner in which
DWR calculated the quantity available for transfer. As described above, for
water conserved as a result of fallowing, the Department multiplied the
amount of land farmed during 1990 (or set aside under the federal farm
commodity program, but planned for farming in 1991) by its own estimate of

158. See e.g., Sacramento River Water Right Contract No. 14-06-200-7422A Between
the United States Bureau of Reclamation and Woodland Farms, Ltd. (now held by the
Conaway Conservancy Group as successor-in-interest to Woodland Farms, Ltd.).
159. See e.g., Letter from Neil W. Schild, Assistant Director of the Mid-Pacific Region,
United States Bureau of Reclamation, to the Conaway Conservancy Group (Feb. 14, 1991)(on
file with the author). The reductions were announced in United States Bureau of Reclamation,
Mid-Pacific Region, Central Valley Project Water Supply for 1991, at 1 (1991).
160. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, MID-PACIFIC REGION, 1991 CENTRAL VALLEY
PROJECT WATER TRANSFER GUIDELINES, at 1 (1991); Telephone interview with Neil W. Schild,
Assistant Director of the Mid-Pacific Region of the United States Bureau of Reclamation (Aug.
8, 1992); see Letter from Neil W. Schild, Assistant Director of the Mid-Pacific Region of the
United States Bureau of Reclamation, to Steve Macaulay, Manager of the Drought Water Bank,
California Department of Water Resources (Jan. 27, 1992)(on file with author).
161. Letter from Neil W. Schild, Assistant Regional Director, Mid-Pacific region of the
United States Bureau of Reclamation, to Steve Macaulay, Manager of the Drought Water
Bank, California Department of Water Resources (Jan 27, 1992)(on file with author).
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the quantity of water consumed by the type of crop irrigated by the seller.162
For water made available by shifting to groundwater, DWR simply credited
the transferor for the amount of groundwater pumped as a substitute
supply.163 Where there were conflicts between the two methods, the CVP
contractor was permitted to transfer the lesser calculated amount.164
The Bureau's transfer policy raises two questions. First, was it proper
for the Bureau to prohibit the transfer of "project water" to the Water Bank?
Second, was it lawful for the Bureau to permit the transfer of the Sacramento
River water rights settlement contractor's base supplies without seeking the
approval of the State Water Resources Control Board?
The decision not to allow transfers of project water to the Water Bank
was based primarily on the Bureau's judgment that, with severe shortages
throughout the CVP system, it would be inappropriate to approve the
transfer of project water to non-CVP contractors. In other words, other CVP
contractors should have the first call on the project water available within
the system.165 While this may have been a legitimate managerial decision
regarding the proper allocation of project supplies, it does not fully explain
the categorical judgment that no project water could be sold to the Water
Bank. Three of the purchasers of water from the Bank are CVP contractors:
the Contra Costa Water District, the Santa Clara Valley Water District, and
the Westlands Water District. Together, these purchasers acquired 40,287
acre-feet from the Bank.166 If CVP project water had not been sold to the
Water Bank, that water could have been segregated for accounting purposes
from the other water and delivered exclusively to these existing CVP
contractors. This arrangement would have helped the Bureau to make up
some of the supply deficiencies that existed throughout the CVP system.
Moreover, because the water could have been delivered through the
Bureau's existing Delta facilities, the transfer from the Sacramento River
contractors to the Bay Area and San Joaquin Valley CVP contractors could
have been accomplished without changing the Bureau's water rights permits
and therefore without the approval of the State Water Resources Control
Board.167 Inasmuch as the amount of project water offered for sale by the
Sacramento River water rights settlement contractors was small, however,

162. HOWITT REPORT, supra note 54, at 11-12; see supra text accompanying notes
61-64 (on file with author).
163.

HOWITT REPORT, supra note 54, at 12.

164. Telephone interview with Steve Macaulay, Manager of the Drought Water
Bank, California Department of Water Resources (Aug. 6, 1992).
165. Telephone interview with Neil W. Schild, Assistant Director of the MidPacific Region, United States Bureau of Reclamation (Aug. 10, 1992).
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1992 SWR REPORT, supra note 7, at 6.

167.

See Gray, supra note 115, at 779-80.
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the Bureau's restrictions on the transfer of such water were of little
practical consequence.168
The decision to permit the transfer of the Sacramento River water
rights settlement contractors' base supplies poses a more important, and
more difficult, legal issue. Although the water supplied to the water rights
settlement contractors is technically water appropriated by the Bureau of
Reclamation under its permits for the CVP, the Bureau and DWR took the
position that the base supply component of this water service could be
transferred without complying with the transfer laws applicable to changes
in water rights permits, because the base supply represents the pre-project
rights of the contractors. Inasmuch as the underlying riparian and pre-1914
appropriative rights are exempt from the Board's permit and license
jurisdiction, they should not now be subject to the Board's authority over
transfers of permitted rights simply because those rights are now embodied
in the Bureau's water rights permits for the CVP.169
There is some merit to this analysis, for there is no inherent reason
why water rights that predate the CVP should lose their legal character
simply because they are incorporated contractually into the CVP system.
From the Bureau's perspective, the base supply is not part of the project
supply created by construction of the CVP. Therefore, that water should not
be included in the "pool" of water to be distributed as equitably as possible
among the hundreds of CVP contractors during times of system-wide
shortage. From the vantage point of the managers of the Water Bank,
characterizing the base supply as "pre-project" water has the twin
advantages of allowing the water to be transferred to the Water Bank in
accordance with the Bureau's policies and without having to go through the
change in water right procedures administered by the State Water Resources
Control Board. What is curious, however, is the Board's view of this
important question. For the consequence of treating the Sacramento River
contractors' base supply as the legal equivalent of their pre-project rights is
to relinquish jurisdiction over the transfer of such water.

168. Telephone interview with Steve Macaulay, Manager of the Drought Water
bank, California Department of Water Resources (Aug. 8, 1992) For the future,
Congress has directed that all water supplied by the CVP be transferable according to
California law and additional federal statutory criteria. Central Valley Project
Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, Sections 3401-3412, 106 Stat. 4706 (1992). The
transfer provisions of the Act are analyzed in Gray, supra note 1, at 285-95.
169. Telephone interview with Steve Macaulay, Manager of the Drought Water Bank,
California Department of Water Resources (Aug. 8, 1992); Interview with Walter Pettit,
Executive Director of the State Water Resources Control Board (Aug 14. 19920; Telephone
interview with Neil W. Schild, Assistant Director of the Mid-Pacific Region of the United
States Bureau of Reclamation (Aug. 10. 1992).
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According to its Executive Director and Assistant Chief Counsel, the
Board did not object to the Bureau's and DWR's legal characterization of the
CVP base supplies of attempt to exercise jurisdiction over these water
transfers for two reasons. First, the staff members of the Board who reviewed
the contracts for the transfer of the CVP base supplies simply did not focus
on this as a serious legal issue.170 Second, the Board's overriding goal was
expeditiously to implement the Governor's emergency drought policies. In
the words of the Executive Director, "We were trying to make the Water Bank
work. We were not looking for things to argue about."171 Rather, in reviewing
the proposed transfers of the CVP base supplies, the Board's staff sought to
protect third-party interests and to guard against "glaring" legal errors.172
The proper characterization of the CVP base supply is a controversial
issue. The Sacramento River water rights settlement contractors regard the
base supply as water to which they continue to hold the underlying rights,
even though the water is formally delivered pursuant to CVP contract. This
characterization is consistent with the history of water resources
development along the Sacramento River. It also affords the contractors
maximum flexibility over the use and disposition of the base supply,
because the water would be exempt from the permit and license and water
transfer jurisdiction of the Board.173 The Bureau of Reclamation has agreed
to this characterization of the base supply as a matter of contract
interpretation.174 At least for purposes of the 1991 Water bank, the
Department of Water Resources has adopted the same characterization of
the CVP base supply. As the Manager of the Water Bank has stated, the CVP
contracts "do not change pre-existing rights. Rather, they 'settle' amounts of
water under such rights for the purpose of operating the CVP." He noted,
however, that "[i]n the case of an adjudication, all bets are off, and the court
[would] settle such rights."175
In contrast, the Board does not believe that the CVP base supplies are
necessarily tantamount to the pre-project riparian and pre-1914
appropriative rights of the Sacramento River contractors. As the Assistant
Chief Counsel to the Board has observed, the base supply quantities set

170. Telephone interview with Walter Pettit, Executive Director, and Andrew H.
Sawyer, Assistant Chief Counsel, State Water Resources Control Board, (Sept. 14, 1993).
171. Telephone interview with Walter Pettit, Executive Director of the State
Water Resources Control Board, (Aug. 14, 1992).
172. Telephone interview with Walter Pettit, Executive Director of the State
Water Resources Control Board, (Sept. 14, 1993).
173.

See Gray, supra note 115, at 768 & note 161.

174. Telephone interview with Neil W. Schild, Assistant Director of the MidPacific Region of the United States Board of Reclamation (Aug. 10, 1992).
175. Letter from Steve Macaulay, Manager of the Drought Water Bank,
California Department of Water Resources (January 6, 1993)(on file with author).
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forth in the CVP water rights settlement contracts are not the product of a
basin-wide adjudication, and "everyone admits that the Sacramento River
water right holders 'firmed up' their existing rights, particularly in dry
years."176 Moreover, in implementing the base supply transfers to the 1991
Water Bank, the Bureau retained water in storage for later release for the
benefit of purchasers in the central and southern parts of the state.
Inasmuch as storage is not part of the riparian right, the transfers from the
CVP water rights settlement contractors that held pre-project riparian rights
therefore could not have been accomplished consistently with the sellers'
underlying riparian rights. Similarly, most of the Sacramento River water
rights settlement contractors that held pre-1914 appropriative rights before
the construction of the CVP had only direct diversion rights. Thus, the use of
the Bureau's upstream storage capabilities to facilitate the transfers was
beyond the scope of those transferors' pre-project water rights.177 In short, as
administered during the 1991 Water Bank, the transfer of the CVP base
supplies necessarily implicated the Bureau's water rights permits for the
CVP and therefore should have been subject tot he jurisdiction of the Board.
The Board's staff who subsequently have looked at this issue candidly
admit that the Board's legal analysis at the time was problematic. Attorneys for
the Board were not closely involved in the evaluation of the CVP transfers.178 Its
Assistant Chief Counsel has stated that DWR and the Bureau "represented that
[Board] review was not necessary, and we didn't look too closely at the theory.
In fact, I'm not sure we even knew the theory."179 For the future, however, both
the Executive Director and the Assistant Chief Counsel agree that the Board will
assert its jurisdiction over those transfers of CVP base supplies that exceed the
scope of the transferors' pre-project water rights and which require a change in
the points of diversion, places of use, or purposes of use set forth in the
Bureau's water rights permits for the CVP.180
The transfers of the CVP base supplies to the 1991 Water Bank
implicated two policies that were often in tension. On the one hand,
removal of those transfers from the review process administered by the
Board facilitated both the creation of the Water Bank and the expeditious
movement of water from areas of surplus to areas of deficiency. In view of
the water supply conditions facing the state at the time this decision was

176. Telephone interview with Andrew H. Sawyer, Assistant Chief Counsel,
State Water Resources Control Board (Sept. 13, 1993)(on file with author).
177. Id. In contrast, a "simple by-pass transfer" that did not require the use of
CVP storage facilities might be exempt from the Board's transfer jurisdiction as within
the pre-project riparian or pre-1914 appropriative rights of the transferor. Id.
178.

Id.

179.

Id.

180. Telephone interview with Walter Pettit, Executive Director, and Andrew H. Sawyer,
Assistant Chief Counsel, State Water Resources Control Board (Sept. 14, 1993).
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made, it is difficult to fault the Board's decision to place a premium on
these water supply goals. On the other hand, the laws that govern the
Board's review and approval of transfers that are subject to its jurisdiction
provide the only means by which third parties who claim that they will be
injured by a water transfer may formally object to the proposal or seek to
condition the transfer on measures designed to mitigate such harm.181 The
consequence of the Board's forbearance of authority therefore was to create
a vacuum in which there existed no formal means of determining whether
the CVP base supply transfers could be accomplished consistently with
California's statutory transfer policies of considering the effects on thirdparty water rights holders, fish and wildlife, other instream uses, and other
interests of the area from which the water was transferred.
E.

Transfers For Which Groundwater Was Substituted

The remaining category of water that was transferred to the 1991 Water
Bank was surface water held pursuant to a variety of types of rights—
including permitted and licensed appropriative rights—for which the
transferor substituted groundwater as a replacement water supply. As with
the transfers of water held under riparian right and pursuant to CVP water
rights settlement contracts, these transfers occurred without the approval of
the State Water Resources Control Board.182 Yet, many of the "groundwater
replacement transfers" seemingly were subject to review by the Board
because they required changes in the point of diversion, place of use, and in
some cases the purpose of use set forth in the transferors' permits and
licenses. The Department of Water Resources nevertheless was able to avoid
the Board's jurisdiction by characterizing these transfers as involving only
"groundwater," over which the Board has no jurisdiction, rather than as
transfers of "surface water."183 Thus, under DWR's theory, transfers of surface
water (which the transferors replaced through increased pumping of
groundwater) were treated for legal purposes as though they were transfers
of groundwater (which the transferors did not need because they continued to
use their full surface water allotments).
As with the transfers of CVP base supplies, DWR's purpose was to
purchase water for the Bank as quickly as possible, and submission of the
groundwater replacement transfers to the Board would have delayed

181.

See supra text accompanying notes 139-43.

182. Telephone interview with Steve Macaulay, Manager of the Drought Water Bank,
California Department of Water Resources (Aug. 8, 1992); Telephone interview with Walter
Pettit, Executive Director of the State Water Resources Control Board (Aug. 14, 1992).
183. Telephone interview with Steve Macaulay, Manager of the Drought Water
Bank, California Department of Water Resources (Aug. 8, 1992).
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implementation of those contracts.184 The Department's solution to the
"problem" of Board review, however, raised the question, however, whether
the transfers would be subject to a provision of the "Protected Areas"
legislation that was enacted in 1984 to protect local areas in which water
originates from future exports of water that is "reasonably required to
adequately supply the beneficial needs of the protected area."185
Section 1220 of the Water Code stipulates that
[n]o groundwater shall be pumped for export from within
the combined Sacramento and Delta-Central Sierra Basins,
as defined in Department of Water Resources Bulletin 16074, unless the pumping is in compliance with a
groundwater management plan that is adopted by
ordinance . . . by the county board of supervisors, in full
consultation with affected water districts, and that is
subsequently approved by a vote in the counties or portions
of counties that overlie the groundwater basin. . . .186
All of the "groundwater" transfers to the 1991 Water Bank involved
water from the Sacramento Basin as defined by section 1220.187 Thus, the
statute would appear clearly to have been applicable to such transfers.
Nonetheless, the Department of Water Resources determined that the law
did not apply because, for purposes of section 1220, the transfers were of surface
water, not groundwater.188
Thus, to avoid the Board's jurisdiction under the water transfer laws,
DWR defined the groundwater replacement transfers as "groundwater
transfers." Yet, to circumvent the application of section 1220, the
Department characterized the same transfers as "surface water transfers."
The obvious legal question presented by this linguistic legerdemain is
whether the Board should have permitted DWR to have it both ways—

184.

Id.

185.

CAL. WATER CODE § 1216 (West Supp. 1994).

186. Id. § 1220(a). An exception is made for water that has percolated into the
groundwater basin "from any reservoir, afterbay, or other facility of an export project." Id. The
act provides that such water "may be returned to the water supply of the export project." Id.
Subsection (b) simply authorizes the relevant counties to adopt groundwater management
plans to implement the terms of subsection (a). Id. § 1220(b). Subsection (c) states that the
county board of supervisors may not exercise the powers granted by § 1220 within the
boundaries of another local water supply agency without that agency's consent. Id. § 1220(c).
187. Telephone interview with Steve Macaulay, Manager of the Drought Water
Bank, California Department of Water Resources (Aug. 8, 1992).
188. Id.; Telephone interview with Walter Pettit, Executive Director of the State
Water Resources Control Board (Aug. 14, 1992).
77

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

alternatively classifying the same water as groundwater or surface water
depending on which characterization would facilitate the transfer of water
without involving the burdensome requirements of change in water right
hearings and area-of-origin protections.
The Board did not assert jurisdiction over the groundwater
replacement transfers because it simply did not see the legal question
presented by DWR's characterization of the transfers.189 According to the
Board's Assistant Chief Counsel, "DWR believed that we had no quarrel, but
in fact we never bought off on the theory."190 Indeed, as with the CVP base
supply transfers, this omission may have been the result of the absence of
attorney participation in the Board's informal review of the groundwater
replacement contracts.191
The groundwater replacement transfers are troublesome for two
reasons. First, it is disturbing that the Board—the principal state agency
charged with the management and protection of California's water
resources—would fail to consider the implications of Water Code section
1220 for transfers that the parties themselves have characterized as involving
"groundwater." Indeed, this omission is particularly surprising given the
Board's view that section 1220 categorically prohibits the export of
groundwater from a protected area until the county-of-origin enacts a
groundwater management plan under the authority granted by that statute.192
Second, it is equally disturbing that the Department of Water
Resources—which also has broad responsibility to manage and to protect
the state's water resources193—would alternatively and inconsistently define
the groundwater replacement transfers for the explicit purpose of avoiding
two important laws, one or the other of which was expressly applicable to
such transfers. Section 1220 and the various provisions of the Water Code
that govern the Board's jurisdiction over water transfers are not simply
sterile formalities that can be cavalierly set aside. Rather, these laws provide
the only direct protection for an array of third-party interests—including
other water right holders, fish and wildlife, other instream uses, and
groundwater users—that might be injured by water transfers. In defining the
groundwater replacement transfers so as to circumvent these laws, DWR not

189. Telephone interview with Andrew H. Sawyer, Assistant Chief Counsel,
State Water Resources Control Board (Sept. 14, 1993).
190.

Id.

191. The Board subsequently focused on the question presented by Sec. 1220
in its informal review of the water purchase contracts between DWR and the Yuba
County Water Agency. Telephone interview with Andrew H. Sawyer, Assistant Chief
Counsel, State Water Resources Control Board (Sept. 14, 1993).
192. Telephone interview with Andrew H. Sawyer, Assistant Chief Counsel,
State Water Resources Control Board (Mar. 1, 1993).
193.
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See CAL. WATER CODE § 275 (West Supp. 1994).
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only created the risk that the transfers could proceed without an evaluation
of the hydrological, environmental, and economic consequences. The
Department also dealt with the transfers in a manner that threatened to
undermine public confidence in the efficacy of the laws that are designed to
guarantee the consideration of third-party interests before water is
transferred from one region to another.
Before turning to the analysis of how these interests in fact were
represented during the administration of the Water Bank, two countervailing
factors must be noted. First, if DWR had consistently characterized the
groundwater replacement transfers as involving "groundwater," it is not at all
clear that section 1220 would have barred the transfers. Yolo County had not
enacted a groundwater management plan, and section 1220 would preclude
the transfer of groundwater out of the county only if the statute were
construed to apply even in the absence of a groundwater management plan.
While this would be a plausible reading of section 1220, it is not the most
persuasive interpretation. The purpose of section 1220 was to grant counties
the power to regulate the extraction and export of groundwater. There is no
indication that the Legislature intended to bar all groundwater exports until
the counties choose to regulate. Indeed, interpreting section 1220 as
precluding all groundwater transfers pending the enactment of a
groundwater management plan would permit the counties to frustrate
through inaction implementation of the other state transfer laws, which
uniformly encourage transfers as a means of supplying water deficient areas
of the state. Accordingly, if DWR had acknowledged the potential
applicability of section 1220, it could have found the statute to be
ambiguous and therefore reached the legally defensible conclusion that the
law is inapplicable until the counties exercise the regulatory powers granted
to them by the legislation.194

194. As noted in the text, the Board disputes this construction of section 1220.
According to its Assistant Chief Counsel, the Board interprets section 1220 as
prohibiting all exports of groundwater from protected areas until a county
groundwater management plan is adopted. Telephone interview with Andrew H.
Sawyer, Assistant Chief Counsel, State Water Resources Control Board (Mar. 1, 1993).
In any event, the questions whether groundwater replacement transfers must be
treated as transfers of groundwater for purposes of section 1220 and, if so, whether
section 1220 prohibits export transfers in the absence of a county groundwater
management plan have been put to rest by Assembly Bill 2897, enacted in 1992. A.B.
2897, 1992 Cal. Stat. Ch. 481, section 1. This statute provides:
A water user that transfers surface water pursuant to [section 1745.04]
may not replace that water with groundwater unless the groundwater
use is either of the following:
(a) Consistent with a groundwater management plan adopted
pursuant to state law for the affected area.
79

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

Second, notwithstanding the decision to characterize the nature of the water
transferred for the purpose of avoiding both the Board's jurisdiction over surface
water transfers and the arguable statutory bar on groundwater exports, the
administrators of the Water Bank were uniformly praised for their willingness to
listen to claims that particular transfers to the Bank might adversely affect thirdparty interests.195 Moreover, the Department of Water Resources took some
actions that were not required by the governing law to consider the effects of
certain transfers on both groundwater and the environment and to compensate
(at least partially) for potential harm to local economies.196
F.

Consideration and Protection of Third-Party Interests

The removal of all transfers from Yolo and Solano Counties from the
supervisory jurisdiction of the State Water Resources Control Board
nevertheless eliminated all formal legal means of assessing third-party
effects. As one observer commented, because the Department of Water
Resources never established a "process to invite public participation and
comment," the transfers remained essentially "private contracts between the
transferors and the Water Bank."197 It is in this light then that the question of
how the administrators of the Water Bank considered, and took steps to
mitigate harm to, third-party interests must by analyzed.
Interestingly, there is no evidence that non-participating surface water rights
holders objected to any transfer associated with the Water Bank or criticized DWR
for failing to protect their rights. Rather, the interviews conducted for this study

(b) Approved by the water supplier from whose service area the
water is to be transferred and that water supplier, if a groundwater
management plan has not been adopted, determines the transfer
will not create, or contribute to, conditions of long-term overdraft
in the affected groundwater basin.
CAL. WATER CODE § 1745.10 (West Supp. 1994). The new law does not apply to transfers
of "previously recharged groundwater from an overdrafted groundwater basin" or to the
"replacement of transferred surface water with groundwater previously recharged into
an overdrafted groundwater basin, if the recharge was part of a groundwater banking
operation." Id. § 1745.11. Notwithstanding the limitations on groundwater replacement
transfers, DWR supported this legislation. Letter from Steve Macaulay, Manager of the
Drought Water Bank, California Department of Water Resources (Jan. 6, 1993).
195. Telephone interview with Dick Daniel, Water Management Coordinator of
the California Department of Fish and Game (Aug. 17, 1992); Telephone interview
with Betsy Marchand, Chair of the Yolo County Board of Supervisors (Aug. 14, 1992);
Telephone interview with Judith Redmond, California Action Network (Aug 12, 1992).
196.

See infra part II.F.

197. Telephone interview with Judith Redmond, California Action Network
(Aug 12, 1992).
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identified three areas of strong concern about third-party effects. These were: (1)
the effects of the groundwater replacement transfers on local groundwater
resources; (2) the consequences of the land fallowing contracts on fish and
wildlife; and (3) the unaccounted costs of Water Bank operations on the
economies of the areas from which the water was transferred.
1.

Groundwater Overdraft and Land Subsidence

The strongest criticism of the Water Bank is the claim raised by the Yolo
County Board of Supervisors and the Yolo County Flood Control and Water
Conservation District that the Department of Water Resources did not adequately
evaluate the effects of the groundwater substitution transfers on the groundwater
resources of Yolo County. These officials are concerned that the increased
pumping of groundwater required to replace the transfer of surface water from the
Yolo Bypass area of the county caused both overdraft of the aquifer and
subsidence in adjacent areas. Before considering this claim, it is necessary to
digress briefly to consider the hydrology of Yolo County.
Irrigated agriculture dominates water use in Yolo County, accounting
for ninety-six percent of the applied water use. Municipal and industrial
users—located principally in the cities of Davis, Woodland, and Winters—
take the balance.198 Although many users have access to both surface water
and groundwater, large parts of the county rely exclusively on
groundwater.199 These areas include the Yolo-Zamora Water District, and the
cities of Davis and Woodland.200
During normal water supply conditions, water users in Yolo County
receive approximately fifty-five percent of their supplies from surface water
sources—Cache Creek, Putah Creek, and the Sacramento River—and about
forty-five percent from groundwater.201 "In drought years, agricultural
groundwater use increases as more groundwater is pumped by farmers to
make up for shortfalls in rain and surface water supplies."202 Because

198. MIMI JENKINS, YOLO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA'S WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM: CONJUNCTIVE
USE WITHOUT MANAGEMENT 12-13 (1992) [hereinafter JENKINS REPORT].
199. There are two hydrologically distinct aquifers in Yolo County: a shallow to
intermediate depth aquifer, which is located within 700 feet of the surface of the overlying
land, and a deep aquifer, the level of which is greater than 1,000 feet in depth. Id. at 17.
Although the deep aquifer is used by the University of California at Davis, it is not
considered to be a significant or reliable source of supply for the county. Id. The shallow to
intermediate depth aquifer is located in the eastern and south-central parts of the county.
Western and north-central Yolo County have to groundwater reserves. Id. at 6, 17.
200. YOLO COUNTY, WATER PLAN UPDATE 19 (1992) (draft) [hereinafter DRAFT
WATER PLAN UPDATE].
201.

Id. at 13.

202.

JENKINS REPORT, supra note 198, at 21.
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recharge from rainfall and other surface water sources also is reduced during
drought conditions, this increased pumping will cause the groundwater
table to drop. It has been estimated that net groundwater depletion during
1991 was approximately 140,000 acre-feet.203 Of this amount, 47,800 acre-feet
(or thirty-six percent) has been attributed to the fallowing and groundwater
substitution transfers to the 1991 Water Bank.204 These transfers totaled
96,900 and 57,400 acre-feet, respectively.205
The groundwater substitution transfers were concentrated in and along
the Yolo Bypass in the eastern portion of the County.206 The additional
groundwater withdrawal required to replace the surface supplies sold to the
Water bank was controversial for two reasons. First, although most of the
lands involved in the groundwater replacement transfers are outside the Yolo
County Flood Control and Water Conservation District, the groundwater
generally moves within the basin from west to east toward the area in which
most of the additional pumping occurred.207 As a consequence, the District
believed that the increased groundwater extraction associated with the Water
Bank would diminish the groundwater supplies available to its members.208
Second, the adjacent area west of the lands that were involved in the
groundwater replacement transfers has experienced groundwater overdraft
over the past forty years,209 as well as land subsidence of between four and six

203. U.C. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 126, at 19. Another study estimates that, under
surface water supply conditions comparable to 1991 but without the benefit of the March rains,
a total of 760,100 acre-feet of groundwater would have to be pumped to maintain 1991
irrigation levels. This would represent a seventy-four percent increase over the average annual
groundwater extractions of 436,100 acre-feet. JENKINS REPORT, supra note 198, at 23.
204.

U.C. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 126, at 19.

205.

Id. at 18.

206. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, STATE DROUGHT WATER BANK:
PROGRAM ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT 21 (1993) [hereinafter "WATER BANK EIR"].
207.

JENKINS REPORT, supra note 198, at 29.

208. Telephone interview with James F. Eagan, General Manager of the Yolo County
Flood Control and Water Conservation District (Aug. 14, 1992). DWR also has concluded that
pumping in the Yolo Bypass area has formed a cone of depression, which both increases the
west-to-east movement of groundwater down gradient and causes groundwater to flow west from
the Sacramento River into the area of the increased extraction. A 1992 test indicated that
approximately 30 percent of the water pumped from these wells may be from seepage from the
Sacramento River. WATER BANK EIR, supra note 206, at 122.
209. JENKINS REPORT, supra note 198, at 33-34. The overdraft in this area has
occurred over the 40-year period, in any given year, of course, the groundwater table may
rise and fall, depending on variations in the level of pumping and recharge from both
surface and subsurface sources. See DRAFT WATER PLAN UPDATE, supra note 200, at 22-27.
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feet.210 Both the Yolo county Board of Supervisors and the Yolo County Flood
Control and Water Conservation District believed that the groundwater
substitution transfers would exacerbate the overdraft of the aquifer and pose a
significant risk of contributing to further land subsidence.211
Four actions were taken to address these concerns. First, DWR required
each participant in the groundwater replacement transfers to install "totalizing
flowmeters" on the discharge of each of the seller's wells.212 Second, the Yolo
County Board of Supervisors entered into a memorandum of understanding with
the Conaway Conservancy—one of the largest groundwater replacement
transferors—which required it to establish "a program to monitor the behavior of
groundwater in the vicinity" of its wells.213 DWR included similar requirements in
its contracts with the other groundwater replacement transferors and agreed to
reimburse the sellers for 50 percent of their monitoring expenses up to a fixed
limit. 214 Third, under threat of litigation, the Board of Supervisors persuaded each
participating seller to limit the amount of groundwater that could be pumped as a
substitute for transferred surface water to the seller's maximum annual use during

210. Id.; WATER BANK EIR, supra note 206, at 115. There is some evidence that
the subsidence also has been caused by natural gas extraction in the area. DRAFT
WATER PLAN UPDATE, supra note 200, at 30.
211. Telephone interview with Betsy Marchand, Chair of the Yolo County
Board of Supervisors (Aug. 14, 1992); Telephone interview with James F. Eagan,
General Manager of the Yolo County Flood Control and Water Conservation District
(Aug. 14, 1992); U.C. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 126, at 21 (comments of James F.
Eagan). DWR partially disputes this contention. According to the Department, while
[i]t is true that there is possible subsidence in this area...actual
subsidence has only been confirmed in the Yolo-Zamora area some
distance to the north and west. There does not appear to be long-term
overdraft in the Woodlands-Davis area, although there are substantial
water level depressions due to continual pumping for urban use. The
concern is not overdraft; rather, it is the threat of future subsidence due
to water levels falling below their historical levels.
Letter from Robert G. Potter, Chief Deputy Director of the California Department of
Water Resources 2 (Sept. 8, 1993) (on file with author).
212. See e.g., Contract Between the California Department of Water Resources
and the Conaway Conservancy Group for 1991 Emergency Drought Water Supply,
Exhibit C (Apr. 9, 1991) [hereinafter Conaway Contract] (on file with author).
213. See e.g., Yolo County Board of Supervisors, Agreement No. 91-33.
Memorandum of Understanding, in Conaway Contract, supra note 212, Exhibit D, at 3.
214. Id. at 9; Letter from Robert G. Potter, Chief Deputy Director of the
California Department of Water Resources 2 (Sept. 8, 1993) (on file with author).
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the ten preceding years as measured by existing well records.215 Fourth, the Board
of Supervisors imposed a two percent gross receipts charge on the revenue
received by the seller from the water transferred to the Water Bank.216 DWR agreed
to reimburse the seller's costs of paying this surcharge.217
Notwithstanding the great concern about the groundwater
replacement transfers, there is no evidence that the additional groundwater
pumping either caused land subsidence or has significantly lowered well
levels in up-gradient portions of the basin. University of California
researchers have stated that
it is not possible at this time to establish the degree of
subsidence resulting from the water bank. Field
measurements are essential but the instrumentation has
not been in place long enough to allow quantification.
Thus, the conclusion at this time is limited to concern
about subsidence—concern for protection of levees, for
example, and drainage canal slopes.218
DWR has concluded more categorically that "[n]o significant adverse
impacts were detected in Yolo County during 1991 as a result of pumping for
the water bank," and that subsequent monitoring has not contradicted this
conclusion.219 Indeed, even Yolo County officials agree that there is no firm
evidence that the 1991 and 1992 Water Bank transfers caused any irreparable
harm to the structure of the aquifer or to other County interests.220
These past transfers are not the county's primary concern, however. Rather,
County officials fear that DWR has targeted the Yolo Bypass area as a principal
source of supply for future water banks and for transfers to individual purchasers
in the urban areas of the state.221 They believe that all of the water presently

215. Yolo County Board of Supervisors, Agreement No. 91-33. Memorandum of
Understanding, in Conaway Contract, supra note 212, Exhibit D, at 3.
216. Id. The county pledged to use this revenue "solely to fund activities in
implementing the County's Water Plan and to integrate local water resources of [the seller]
and others for the long-term benefits of [the seller]...,the local community, and the County." Id.
217.

See e.g., Conaway Contract, supra note 212, at 9.

218.

U.C. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 126, at 20-21.

219.

WATER BANK EIR, supra note 206, at 122.

220. Telephone interview with Betsy Marchand, Chair of the Yolo County Board of
Supervisors (Aug. 14, 1992);
220. Telephone interview with James F. Eagan, General
Manager of the Yolo County Flood Control and Water Conservation District (Aug. 14, 1992).
221. Telephone interview with Betsy Marchand, Chair of the Yolo County Board of
Supervisors (Aug. 14, 1992); Telephone interview with James F. Eagan, General Manager of the
Yolo County Flood Control and Water Conservation District (Aug. 14, 1992).
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available to Yolo County will be needed within the County to supply future
demands and are concerned that DWR does not understand the effects of the
surface water and groundwater exports on the groundwater hydrology.222 As
described by the Chairwoman of the Board of Supervisors, the measures adopted
by the County and DWR in 1991 were at best temporary protections that did not
"speak at all to the subsidence issue . . . The problem was that DWR had no longrange plan to address third-party impacts."223
In view of these concerns, it is surprising that the Yolo County Board of
Supervisors did not attempt to exercise the authority granted to it by section
1220 of the Water Code to enact a groundwater management plan.224 Such a
plan might limit the pumping of groundwater to the sustainable yield of the
aquifer or prohibit the use of groundwater substitution contracts unless the
extractor could prove that the increased pumping would not overdraft the
aquifer or cause subsidence. The General Manager of the Yolo County Flood
Control and Water Conservancy District explained that it had been
impossible even to obtain a consensus on the draft Yolo County Water Plan
Update—a document that is without binding legal consequence—and that
placing restrictions on the use of a presently unregulated resource would be
even more difficult.225 Indeed, according to the Chairwoman of the Board of
Supervisors, many farmers in Yolo County seem to fear the creation of a
local groundwater management agency even more than they worry about the
effects of future groundwater exports.226
In any event, the Department of Water Resources' decision to
characterize all of the groundwater transfers as "surface water transfers," and
therefore to exempt them form section 1220, pretermitted this strategy. Yet,
given the State Water Resources Control Board's interpretation of section
1220 as applying of its own force, even in the absence of a county
groundwater management plan,227 it is odd that Yolo County did not
challenge DWR's characterization and try to use the statute to bar the
groundwater replacement transfers.
For the future, Yolo County may take some comfort in DWR's preparation
of an environmental impact report on the Water Bank. Yet, the report is short on

222. Telephone interview with Betsy Marchand, Chair of the Yolo County Board of
Supervisors (Aug. 14, 1992); Telephone interview with James F. Eagan, General Manager of the
Yolo County Flood Control and Water Conservation District (Aug. 14, 1992).
223. Telephone interview with Betsy Marchand, Chair of the Yolo County
Board of Supervisors (Aug. 14, 1992).
224.

See supra text accompanying note 186.

225. Telephone interview with James F. Eagan, General Manager of the Yolo
County Flood Control and Water Conservation District (Aug. 14, 1992).
226. Telephone interview with Betsy Marchand, Chair of the Yolo County
Board of Supervisors (Aug. 14, 1992).
227.

See supra note 194.
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specific protections for Yolo County and other areas concerned about
groundwater exports. It describes the "intense level of monitoring" conducted in
the Yolo Bypass area during the 1991 and 1992 Water Banks and states that "the
results of this monitoring program will provide the basis for evaluating the
effects of future pumping in the area."228 The report notes, however, that the
Yolo county monitoring "is considered close to maximum in terms of potential
concerns to be addressed and the significance of potential impacts" and
concludes that "no significant adverse effects were detected in Yolo County"
from either the 1991 or the 1992 Water Bank.229
Nor is Yolo County likely to find much solace in AB 2897, which the
Legislature enacted in 1992 in response to the problems presented by the
groundwater replacement transfers.230 The Water Code now prohibits
groundwater replacement transfers unless the groundwater use associated
with the transfer is consistent with an adopted county groundwater
management plan or, in the absence of such a plan, is "[a]pproved by the
water supplier from whose service area the water is to be transferred" based
on the supplier's determination that the transfer "will not create, or
contribute to, conditions of long-term overdraft in the affected groundwater
basin."231 Until Yolo County adopts a groundwater management plan, this
statute clearly grants local water suppliers such as the Yolo County Flood
Control and Water Conservation District authority to block the transfer of
groundwater or surface water for which groundwater is substituted. The
problem for the County, however, is that virtually all of the groundwater
replacement transfers to the 1991 Water Bank, as well as most of the
potential future groundwater replacement transfers that County officials
fear, were made by water users that do not receive water from a local water
supplier. Rather, the transfers from the Yolo Bypass area were made
predominantly by CVP contractors whose land is outside the boundaries of
the local water agencies. Consequently, unless or until Yolo county enacts a
groundwater management plan, the County and the various local agencies
that supply water within the county will have to look to the Bureau of
Reclamation to represent their interests under the new legislation.232

228.

WATER BANK EIR, supra note 206, at 121-22.

229.

Id. at 122.

230.

See supra note 194.

231.

CAL. WATER CODE §1745.10 (West Supp. 1994).

232. The CVP Improvement Act of 1992 does require the Bureau to protect
groundwater resources in areas from which it authorizes the transfer of project water.
Section 3405(a)(a)(j) of the Act stipulates that the Bureau may not approve a transfer that
would create "significant long-term adverse impact[s] on groundwater conditions in the
transferor's service area." The CVP Improvement Act of 192, Pub. L. No. 102-575, §
3405(a)(1)(j), 106 STAT. 4706 (1992). For an analysis of the water transfer provisions of the
CVP Improvement Act, see Gray, The Modern Era in California Water Law, supra note 1 at 273-78.
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Fish and Wildlife Protection

A number of concerns also were raised about the effects of Water
Bank operations on fish and wildlife. The transfers associated with the
Water Bank had three principle environmental effect in the areas from
which water was transferred.
First, the alteration in releases from upstream reservoirs, the movement of
additional water across the Delta, and the attendant increase in pumping from
the CVP and SWP facilities in the south Delta posed a variety of threats to
several species of fish in the Sacramento River basin and in the Delta. These
included increases in water temperature and salinity above the levels required
for spawning and survival of eggs and larvae, alteration of flows needed for outmigration of juvenile anadromous fish, and entrainment of fish at the Tracy and
Banks pumping plants. The species of greatest concern were Chinook salmon,
striped bass, American shad, and the Delta smelt.233
Second, the fallowing of land in the lower Sacramento River and in the
Delta reduced feed grain and nesting habitat for wildlife and waterfowl. As
DWR has noted,
Fallowing of cereal grain crops (corn, rice, wheat, and barley)
had a high potential for wildlife impacts. Waste grain in
harvested fields provides a substantial portion of seasonal food
requirements for both migrating and resident wildlife . . .
Removal of vegetative cover severely restricts the density and
diversity of wildlife species present.234
In addition, fallowing may reduce the food supply in the immediate
region available for migratory waterfowl. "Consequences range from reduced
bird weight before migration back to nesting areas, to increased pressure on
surrounding farmlands with either higher bird populations, increased crop
losses, or both.235
Third, the transfers associated with the Water Bank—and the
consequent changes in impoundments, diversions, and cropping patters—
had some beneficial effects on fish and wildlife. DWR as observed, for
example, that the
[c]apture of juvenile fish in unscreened pumps and diversions
in the Delta and Sacramento River were reduced since water
diversions to farmland were reduced under fallowing contracts.
Fallowing lands also provided the opportunity to retain more

233.

See DAT REPORT, supra note 8, at 10-11; Fish Impact Memorandum, supra note 92.

234.

WATER BANK EIR, supra note 206, at 142.

235.

Id. at 9.
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water in reservoirs until later in the season, helping to cool river
temperatures to the benefit of salmon. The reduction of
irrigated acreage also reduced salts and chemical loading
during a prolonged period of low river flows.236
The Department of Fish and Game [hereinafter "DFG"] agrees with
this assessment.237
DFG was not involved in the negotiation of either the contracts to
purchase water for the Water Bank or the contracts to sell water acquired by
the Bank. Rather, the contracts were "solicited, negotiated, and signed
before anyone on the 'outside' was able to participate."238 On March 1, 1991,
however, DWR advised the Board that, to "maximize water quality
improvements and minimize the impact of increased exports," it would
"work closely with the Department of Fish and Game and the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service to optimize the scheduling of 'water bank' and other water
transfers."239 The Board directed DWR to conduct an analysis of the effects of
Water Bank transfers on the fisheries of the Sacramento River and Delta
systems.240 Based on this study, DWR made a variety of changes in planned
Water Bank operations to reduce the effects of the transfers on Chinook
salmon in the Sacramento River and on striped bass, American shad, and
Delta smelt populations in the Delta.241 DFG helped to conduct this analysis

236.

1992 DWR REPORT, supra note 7, at 18.

237. Telephone interview with Dick Daniel, Water Management Coordinator of
the California Department of Fish and Game (Aug. 17, 1992).
238.

Id.

239. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, DELTA PROTECTIONS: EFFECT OF
TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS OF WATER RIGHT PERMITS 9 (1991). DWR submitted this document to
the Board in conjunction with a joint petition filed by the Department and the Bureau of
Reclamation temporarily to amend the permits for the SWP and the CVP (1) to increase the 28day running average of mean daily chloride concentrations at three points in the Delta to 300
mg/L. CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, NOTICE OF EMERGENCY HEARING AND
BOARD MEETING: CONSIDERATION OF DROUGHT-RELATED EMERGENCY WATER RIGHT ORDER AND RELATED
ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR A HEARING FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES
(1991). As noted above, the parties subsequently withdrew the petition. See supra text
accompanying notes 89-90.
240.

1992 DWR REPORT, supra note 7, at 10; Fish Impacts Memo, supra note 92.

241. 1992 DWR REPORT, supra note 7, at 10-11. For example, DWR asked the Bureau of
Reclamation to retain in Shasta Reservoir water purchased by the Bank from CVP contractors
for later release when the water would help to maintain temperature levels needed for
spawning winter-run Chinook salmon. The Department deferred pumping from the south
Delta that had been scheduled for May and June "to minimize the impacts on striped bass eggs
and larvae." Id. at 10. It also limited Delta exports during July and August to reduce entrainment
of American shad, striped bass, and Delta smelt. Previously scheduled spring and summer
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and concurred in the administrative changes implemented by DWR. Indeed,
the Water Management Coordinator for DFG has stated that the
administrators of the Water Bank "made a sincere effort to work with Fish
and Game and to mitigate environmental impacts."242
Post hoc participation in the mitigation of harm to fisheries is not an
adequate substitute, however, for involvement in the decision ab initio to
enter into particular transfer contracts. The adverse environmental effects
from some transfers may be impossible to mitigate fully. More importantly,
the cumulative effects from the aggregation of all of the transfers that
comprise the Water Bank will inevitably limit the mitigation measures that
DFG may recommend or that DWR may impose. Mitigation measures—such
as reservoir reoperation and delayed Delta pumping—that would render it
impossible to fulfill the purchase contracts, for example, could not be
undertaken without breaching those contracts.243 In response to these types
of concerns, the Water Management Coordinator for the DFG sat on the
"Water Purchase Committee" of the 1992 Water Bank.244 This gave DFG the
opportunity to critique the transfer proposals before the contracts were
signed and to recommend mitigation measures that could be written into
the purchase and sales contracts.
Even with this opportunity for early participation, however, two
problems remain. First, other interested parties—such as private fishing
organizations, local governmental officials, and environmental
organizations—do not have a formal opportunity to comment on the
transfer proposals until they become faits accompli. In contrast, if the transfers
were subject to the jurisdiction of the Board, the agency would make an
independent evaluation of the potential harms caused by the changes in
storage, diversion, and use and would be required to conduct a public
hearing on the proposals if it were unable unilaterally to determine that the

deliveries to Water Bank customers in the San Joaquin Valley and Southern California were
made from water stored in the San Luis Reservoir. DWR then replaced the water in San Luis
Reservoir "in September and October when it could be moved through the Delta with
minimum effects on fisheries. In addition, a portion of the water was held in reservoirs north of
the Delta as carryover storage, reducing exports during 1991." Id. at 11.
242. Telephone interview with Dick Daniel, Water Management Coordinator of
the California Department of Fish and Game (Aug. 17, 1992).
243. This would not be true, however, if the decision to alter the purchase contracts
was made on the basis of an existing legal directive to protect the environment or an
endangered species. In such a case, the existing law, be it the Endangered Species Act, the
public trust doctrine, or the Delta water quality standards established under the PorterCologne and Clean Water Acts, would take precedence over the contracts. See United States v.
State Water Resources Control Board, 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 145-48 (1st Dist. 1986).
244. Interview with Dick Daniel, Water Management Coordinator of the
California Department of Fish and Game (Aug. 17, 1992).
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transfers would not unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, and other instream
beneficial uses.245 Second, although DWR and DFG addressed the question
of fisheries protection, no agency developed a firm understanding of the
effects of the Water Bank transfers on migratory waterfowl. DFG's Water
Management Coordinator reported that the fallowing of land in the Delta
and lower Sacramento River to generate water for sale to the Water Bank
"had undetermined effects on waterfowl from lost grain and lost habitat."246
DFG also found evidence of nesting failures from lack of brood water and
cover and observed a shift in geese migration, with many birds moving north
earlier in the year than normal.247 Despite these observations, there was no
systematic evaluation of the effects of land fallowing and other cropping
changes on wildlife and waterfowl.248
The solution to these problems is not to subject all future Water Bank
transfers to review by the State Water Resources Control Board. During
times of severe drought and localized water shortage emergencies, state
officials and participating buyers and sellers must act swiftly to sign
contracts and to move the water through the Bank. In this context, even the
expedited procedures of the Temporary Change provisions of the Water
Code249 could delay the necessary environmental review and Board approval
until it is too late to supply water for pre-irrigation, planting, or supply of
withering row crops and orchards. Rather, what is needed is pre-emergency
evaluation of environmental and other third-party effects of potential transfers.
The outline of this a priori review is the subject of Part III of this article.
3.

Reimbursement of Social Welfare Costs

The third criticism of the Water Bank arose out of the land fallowing
contracts. On January 7, 1992, the Yolo County Board of Supervisors
submitted a $129,305.00 bill to the Department of Water Resources for
reimbursement of the County's additional expenditures for General
Assistance and Aid to Families With Dependent Children allegedly caused
by the increase in unemployment attributable to land fallowing and the
transfer of water to the 1991 Water Bank. The Board of Supervisors
estimated that the fallowing of 40,200 acres in Yolo County decreased the

245.

CAL. WATER CODE § 1727 (West Supp. 1994); see supra note 140.

246. Telephone interview with Dick Daniel, Water Management Coordinator of
the California Department of Fish and Game (Aug. 17, 1992).
247.

Id.

248. In part as a response to these problems associated with land fallowing,
however, DWR did not enter into any fallowing contracts for the 1992 Water Bank.
Letter from Robert. G. Potter, Chief Deputy Director of the California Department of
Water Resources 4 (Sept. 8, 1993) (on file with author).
249.
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demand for agricultural labor, services, and supplies within the County and
consequently put 450 persons out of work. The unemployed workers then
made claims for general assistance and AFDC entitlements, which in turn
increased the County's social services costs by $129,305.00. 250
DWR responded with a detailed letter that challenged both the legality
of the County's claim and the facts on which the claim was premised. It
agreed "that 'third-party impacts' need to be addressed and that local
economic impacts resulting from substantial unanticipated land fallowing
can be significant," but stated that Governor Wilson's "forthcoming water
program" would be the appropriate forum in which to address these
issues."251 DWR then declared that it was unaware of "any legal basis for the
Department to reimburse a county for such costs in the absence of a
contractual provision or statute authorizing it to do so."252 Finally, it
contested the County's assessment of the additional, unreimbursed social
welfare costs that were attributable to the fallowing contracts.
First, DWR observed that "much of the 'fallowed' acreage in Yolo
County was wheat, pasture, and alfalfa, where the farmers agreed not to
irrigate the crops that were already in the ground. We have been told by
farmers that in many cases full or substantial crops were still harvested on
these lands . . . Since wheat farmers were presumably able to use full (or
nearly full) labor inputs, such arrangements may have resulted in a net
increase to the County revenues and little impact to County services."253
Second, DWR asked, "What happened to farm laborers who would have
farmed lands that were fallowed?" Challenging the County's implication that
all such workers applied for general assistance, the Department stated that
at least some of these workers "remained employed and were put to work on
deferred maintenance projects and other tasks."254 Third, DWR suggested
that the farmers who fallowed their lands might well have spent some of the
income received from the Water Bank in Yolo County and argued that the
County would receive additional tax receipts from the farmers' increased
revenues.255 Fourth, the Department noted that "[m]ore than $600,000 was
spent locally in developing the extensive groundwater monitoring program
in the Yolo Bypass. In addition, we have provided more than $100,000

250. Letter from George P. DeMars, Chair of the Yolo County Board of
Supervisors, to David N. Kennedy, Director of the California Department of Water
Resources 1 (Jan. 7, 1992) (on file with author).
251. Letter from Robert. G. Potter, Chief Deputy Director of the California
Department of Water Resources, to Betsy A. Marchand, Chair of the Yolo County
Board of Supervisors 1 (mar. 10, 1992) (on file with author).
252.

Id.

253.

Id. at 2.

254.

Id.

255.

Id. at 2-3.
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directly to Yolo County to continue work on local water resource planning
efforts. Presumably, this money was all spent in the local area."256
DWR advised the Board of Supervisors that to proceed with the
request for reimbursement it would have to make a claim to the State Board
of Control.257 Yolo County subsequently filed a reimbursement claim, which
the Board of Control denied in 1993.258 According to the Chairwoman of the
Board of Supervisors, "going to the State Board of Control is like going to a
bottomless pit; also, this was a new type of claim. It would have cost us
more than $129,000 to develop the information they wanted in order to
submit a new claim. This isn't fair, folks."259
Fairness aside for the moment, DWR's rejection of the claim was clearly
the appropriate response. As the Department itself emphasized, there is no
legal basis (apart from a contract) for a county or any other local agency to seek
reimbursement for lost revenues or increased expenses caused by water
transfers out of the area. Water Code section 386 stipulates that transfers of
water made available by conservation or land fallowing may not "unreasonable
affect the overall economy of the area from which the water is being
transferred."260 But this statute is applicable only to transfers of "surplus" water
that are subject to the State Water Resources Control Board's jurisdiction under
Water Code sections 380-387. As discussed previously, the Board did not have
jurisdiction over any of the transfers from Yolo County.261 Moreover, even if
section 386 were applicable, neither it nor any other provision of California law
authorizes DWR to reimburse counties for the economic consequences of water
transfers that "unreasonably affect" the local economy.
As with most of the other issues analyzed in this paper, however, the
legal resolution of the dispute for purposes of the 1991 Water Bank does not
put the controversy to rest. Yolo County fears that the 1991 Water Bank was
a portent of future efforts by DWR to use the Sacramento River basin
generally, and Yolo County in particular, as a permanent source of

256.

Id. at 3; see supra text accompanying notes 216-17.

257. Letter from Robert. G. Potter, Chief Deputy Director of the California
Department of Water Resources, to Betsy A. Marchand, Chair of the Yolo County
Board of Supervisors 1 (Mar. 10, 1992) (on file with author).
258.

Telephone interview with Charles Mack, Yolo County Counsel (Sept. 13, 1993).

259. U.C. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 126, at 39. (comments of Betsy A.
Marchand). Notwithstanding these concerns, Yolo County submitted its claim to the Board
of Control in December of 1992. Letter from Robert. G. Potter, Chief Deputy Director of the
California Department of Water Resources 4 (Sept. 8, 1993) (on file with author).

92

260.

CAL. WATER CODE § 386 (West Supp. 1994).

261.

See supra part II.B.

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

additional water supply for the growing urban areas of the state.262 DWR
acknowledged at the time that further study is needed "so that we can
develop a future program that can best minimize any adverse impacts."263
Since then, it has taken two steps to reduce the economic disruption and
social costs of transfers associated with the Water Bank. In 1992, the Bank
purchased no water made available by land fallowing.264 And, in the EIR that
the Department has prepared to evaluate the drought water bank program, it
has proposed to acquire water through fallowing contracts generally, as a last
priority after purchasing surplus water and surface water made available by
groundwater substitution.265
The questions raised by Yolo County's reimbursement request are the
fundamental ones that must be grappled with, if not resolved, before future
water banks may be created: To what extent should our laws accord local
communities collective rights to their existing water supplies, and how
should those communal rights be balanced against the claims of the
market? The existence of these questions, and the deeply felt and widely
shared view among California's rural communities that water is an
endowment, is one of the enduring lessons of the 1991 Water Bank.
III.

Five Lessons for Future Water Banks

Despite the jurisdictional criticisms and the concerns over third-party
interests, the first lesson of the state's experience with water banking is that
transfers can play a crucial role in providing supplemental supplies to watershort regions in times of drought. Moreover, at least with the extraordinary
efforts of state, federal, and local water administrators, this reallocation can
occur quickly and with some consideration of the effects of Water Bank operations
on the environment and on the local areas from which water is exported.
The events of the 1991 Water Bank also demonstrate, however, that the
good faith of individual administrators is not an adequate substitute for
formal and systematic protections of third-party interests. As described
above, transactions were manipulated to avoid review by the State Water
Resources Control Board and some transfers were authorized without an
understanding of their effects on the region's groundwater resources, on
instream flows, and on fish and wildlife habitat. The second lesson of the

262. U.C CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 126, at 39. (comments of Betsy A.
Marchand); Telephone interview with Betsy A. Marchand, Chair of the Yolo County
Board of Supervisors (Aug. 14, 1993).
263. Letter from Robert. G. Potter, Chief Deputy Director of the California
Department of Water Resources, to Betsy A. Marchand, Chair of the Yolo County
Board of Supervisors 1 (Mar. 10, 1992) (on file with author).
264.

WATER BANK EIR, supra note 206, at 11.

265.

Id. at 4-5; see infra text accompanying note 278.
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1991 Water Bank therefore is the state must establish a comprehensive and
consistent process for the consideration of third-party interests that are
potentially affected by water transfers, or by their attendant changes in
reservoir operations, groundwater and surface water management, and
cropping patterns.
A first step would be to acknowledge the haphazard nature of the
Board's jurisdiction over water transfers. Important matters such as the
provision to comment on transfer proposals before they are approved, and
the application of formal statutory criteria for the consideration of thirdparty interests should not be contingent on the legal characterization of the
water being transferred. The current state of law—under which some
transfers must be evaluated by the Board, while others are exempt from
formal review—can be explained only by reference to history and tradition.
Changes in riparian and pre-1914 appropriative rights, transfers of
groundwater, and reallocations of CVP base supplies are exempt from the
water transfer statutes simply because the underlying water rights were
accorded "grandfathered" immunity form the modern system of water rights
regulation.266 Yet, the fallowing of riparian land and the release of the
conserved water, or the transfer of CVP base supplies premised on pre-1914
rights and the substitution of groundwater, can have the same effects on fish
and wildlife or groundwater resources in the area from which the water is
exported as a transfer that requires change in the transferor's permit or license.
While greater coherence in water rights administration is a generally
desirable policy goal, the extension of the Board's jurisdiction to cover all
types of water transfers would not be an appropriate response to this
particular problem. For, as emphasized throughout this paper, emergency
drought transfers must be negotiated and implemented quickly—usually in
less than two months. If the Board had to evaluate all transfer proposals
before they could become effective, the administrative proceedings could
delay the transfers well beyond the time in which the water is needed in the
purchasing areas. This is likely to be true even if the Board could make the
findings required by Water code section 1727 on its own, without conducting
noticed, public hearings on the transfer petitions.267 For example, there were

266. When the Legislature enacted the Water Commission Act of 1913, which
established the predecessor to the State Water Resources Control Board, it exempted riparian
rights and appropriations that were commenced prior to the effective date of the statute,
December 19, 1914, from the permit and license system. CAL. WATER CODE § 1201 (West 1971).
The Legislature also limited the coverage of the Act to appropriations of water from bodies of
surface water and from "subterranean streams flowing through known and definite channels."
Id. section 1200. This had the effect of generally exempting groundwater use from the permit
and license system. See Gray, supra note 115, at 747-48.
267.
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351 contracts for the sale of water to the 1991 Water Bank.268 Board review of
these contracts to determine that each transfer individually (and all transfers
cumulatively) would not injure any other legal water user under any
potential hydrological condition or unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, and
other instream beneficial uses could have dragged on through the summer
and fall when the water was most needed in the purchasing areas.
Nor is enhanced local control, such as that created by AB 2897, an
adequate response to the problem of unregulated Water Bank transfers.
Counties-of-origin, local water agencies, and other water users in the area
from which groundwater or surface water is transferred have legitimate
interests both in the region's water resources and in proposals to export
water to other parts of the state. But local entities can be expected to
evaluate the costs and benefits of water transfers from a decidedly parochial
perspective.269 This is particularly true during periods of drought, when other
members of a local water agency, or users with correlative rights to a
groundwater basin, are likely to claim as their own water that another user
proposes to make available for transfer by fallowing or groundwater
substitution. For example, the Yolo County Flood Control and Water
Conservation District strongly objected to the groundwater replacement
transfers to the 1991 Water Bank because of the potential effects of such
transfers on groundwater supplies in its service area, and it is the District's
policy to maintain all currently available supplies for use within the county,
and the District.270 Indeed, as the Chairwoman of the Yolo County Board of
Supervisors has stated, the County "believes that water is a community
resource and that we need to protect it."271
Yet, there are other equally legitimate interests involved in the decision
whether to transfer water. Water deficient areas of the state must have the
ability—either through the market or the political and administrative
processes—to acquire emergency supplies in times of drought. And, state and
federal water officials have a responsibility that transcends local or regional
interests to ensure that domestic users, essential economic sectors, and
environmental needs have adequate supplies. Indeed, the very idea of a state
Water Bank—which is premised on the theory that market forces, rather than
government fiat, should determine the reallocation of water resources—belies
the notion that counties and local water agencies should have a veto over
transfers to other regions of the state.

268.

HOWITT REPORT, supra note 54, at 10; see supra text accompanying note 55.

269. For an insightful and provocative analysis of the policies of local water
agencies regarding transfers to users outside their service area, see Barton H. Thompson,
Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 673 (1993).
270. Telephone interview with James F. Eagan, General Manager of the Yolo
County Flood Control and Water Conservation District (Aug. 14, 1992).
271.

U.C. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 118, at 39 (remarks by Betsy Marchand).
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The market alone will not adequately represent all of the relevant
interests, however. For the parties to the transfer contracts, even with DWR
involvement, can be expected to focus on their bilateral interests—water
supply and demand, price, opportunity costs, and contract terms—and pay
scant if any attention to the interests of the third-parties who will bear the
external costs of the transactions. As Professor Sax has observed, the "future
of water transfers will be jeopardized" unless a broader and more inclusive
model is recognized. A more appropriate model "would be a diplomatic
negotiation and legitimate interests that need to be accommodated, but
without clearly defined rights."272
Thus, there must be a governmental forum in which all of the interests
involved in the operations of the Water Bank can be represented and
evaluated. Moreover, because of the need to respond quickly to localized
water shortages during periods of drought, it is essential that the review and
determination of third-party interests—and the ultimate accommodation of
the interests—of all of the parties—be made expeditiously, as well as
comprehensively.
Evaluation of individual transfers after the agreements between the
water user and the Water Bank are signed would fail both criteria. As noted
above, with hundreds of parties participating in the Water Bank, it would by
impossible for the Board, or any other agency, to review each of the transfer
contracts thoroughly to ensure that Water Bank operations will not violate
the legal protections for third-party interests, but also quickly to allow water
to be transferred to areas of critical shortage in time to meet seasonal
demands. Moreover, sequential review of individual transfer contracts would
present the risk that the cumulative effects of the transfers would not be
adequately considered.
The Department of Water Resources has responded to this problem by
preparing a "Program Environmental Impact Report" on future drought water
banks.273 This document has many positive features. For example, it contains a
detailed analysis of the hydrology of the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta
system that will help both water management officials and the interested public
to understand better how the 1991 and 1992 Water Banks affected the
competing water users, river flows, water quality, fish and wildlife, groundwater,
and land use.274 It also describes a range of possible "significant unavoidable

272.

Id. at 6.

273. See supra note 206. The draft EIR defines the proposed program as "a State
Drought Water Bank, a water supply augmentation program to be implemented...during
periods of drought and other severe water-short periods." WATER BANK EIR, supra note
206, at 1. The EIR covers the next five to ten years. "Within the next 10 years, a
subsequent environmental analysis will be conducted to reexamine actual conditions
under which the proposed program will have operated." Id.
274.
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impacts" and "cumulative impacts" on surface and groundwater supplies, water
quality, fish and wildlife, and local economies from future water bank
operations.275 The report concludes with a discussion of an array of alternatives
to water transfers—ranging from demand reduction to construction of new
facilities to desalination and weather modification—that could be used to
supply critical demands during future droughts.276
For the most part, however, the EIR is a purely advisory document.
Although DWR states that implementation of future drought water banks
will "proceed within the range and scope of effects" set forth in the EIR, 277
the report is bereft of specific limitations, or even policies, that would
govern water transfers, reservoir operations, and water management
decisions associated with the Water Bank. For example, the report does not
define the areas from which water may be transferred as a result of land
fallowing or groundwater substitution without causing significant adverse
third-party effects. Nor does it specify the hydrologic conditions during
which water may be moved through the Delta without posing a substantial
risk to anadromous fish.
The only exceptions are statements that occur in Chapter One of the
EIR under the headings "Priority of Implementation" and "Participant
Guidelines" and in Chapter Six under the title "Cumulative Socioeconomic
Effects." These sections propose substantive policies that define how future
water banks will be administered.
First, water would be acquired from different categories of prospective
sellers based on the size of the aggregate demand for water from the Water
Bank. DWR expressed a general preference for purchases of surplus water
and water made available by groundwater substitution. Purchase of water
from land fallowing would be the lower priority. DWR noted, however, that:
fallowing can be a successful source of water without creating
significant adverse impacts, and is favored by some sellers over
groundwater substitution. Therefore the future strategy will be to
consider transfers on a case-by-case basis, where groundwater
substitution might be the favored source in one region while
fallowing would be the preferred source in another.278
Second, prospective purchasers of water from the Bank would have to
satisfy the following criteria: Municipal and industrial users would be
required, "considering prudent carryover reserves for future years," to use all
available alternative supplies and could purchase water only "to avoid

275.

Id. at 149-86.
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Id. at 187-204.
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significant environmental, economic or social loss or damages that might
otherwise occur if water deliveries were not made."279 Agricultural users also
would have to use all available supplies, considering prudent carryover
storage for "trees, vines, permanent crops, and other crops where the
acquired water would have a high unit value."280 Supplies for fish and
wildlife would be based on annual criteria developed by DFG and "would
depend on the annual condition of fish and wildlife populations and
survival conditions."281
Third, DWR is considering a variety of other strategies to minimize or
to mitigate the effects of future Water Bank transfers on the areas from
which water is sold. These include:
•
•
•

•

Reimbursement of county governments for increased social welfare costs
associated with unemployment caused by land fallowing;
Payments to county governments and local groundwater management
agencies for the development of water management plans;
Limitation on the amount of water generated by land fallowing to 20
percent of the water that would have been applied or stored in the
absence of Water Bank transfers;
Development of priorities for types of water transfers by region.282

These substantive standards are a salutary first step toward the
accommodation of third-party interests and the need for prompt action in
response to emergency water shortages. But the EIR fails to correct the
fundamental problem identified in this paper—the absence of coherent,
systematic review to ensure that transfers associated with the Water Bank,
both individually and collectively, do not create (or exacerbate) groundwater
overdraft, alter stream flows or degrade water quality in ways that pose an
undue risk to anadromous fish, diminish food and habitat for wildlife and
waterfowl, or cause unreasonable disruptions to the local communities from
which water is exported.
What is needed instead is a comprehensive analysis of environmental,
economic, and other potential third-party effects that can serve as a guide
for future water banks. Such a document would contain legally binding
determinations of the controversies that vexed the administration of the
1991 Water Bank and which, if left unresolved, would imperil the
establishment and operation of future banks. Thus, the environmental and
economic analysis would answer such questions as:
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From what areas could additional groundwater be pumped—either for
direct transfer to the Water Bank or as replacement for surface water
sold to the Water Bank—without causing irreparable harm in the form of
land subsidence, non-rechargeable lowering of the water table, and
groundwater pollution?
What limits and conditions should be placed on groundwater extraction
in those areas in which it is permissible in order to avoid or to minimize
these problems?
What restrictions should be placed on reservoir operations, diversions,
and other matters of water rights administration, under a variety of
hydrologic conditions, to ensure that the transfer and changes in water
use associated with the Water Bank do not adversely affect anadromous
fish, instream flows, and water quality in the Delta and in the rivers from
which the water is transferred?
How would the Water Bank affect other endangered or threatened
species, again under a variety of hydrologic conditions?
In what areas could agricultural land be fallowed to make water available
for transfer to the Water Bank without jeopardizing the food supply and
habitat for wildlife and waterfowl?
How do migratory birds and other animals respond to changes in food
supply and habitat—i.e., are there other areas to which they could move
for replacement of the areas lost to the fallowing program?
How much land could be fallowed in each county that participates in the
Water Bank without unduly disrupting local economies and without imposing
unreasonable uncompensated social service costs on local governments?
What other employment opportunities would be available to workers
displaced by changes in farming operations associated with the Water Bank?

Reliable answers to these and other relevant questions will not come
easily or inexpensively. But the product of this endeavor would be well
worth the time and expense involved.
Once the analyses described above were completed, the state would have
a hydrologic map of those regions that are likely to participate in, or be affected
by, future water banks. These areas might include Yuba County, the Sacramento
River, the Yolo Bypass, the Delta, and the west side of the San Joaquin Valley.
Transfers from these areas that are consistent with the findings of the study
would be exempt from review by the State Water Resources Control Board.
Transfers that would violate the limitations and conditions established in the
study to protect third-party interests, as well as transfers from areas not covered
by the study, would be permissible only following public hearings and
authorization by the Board based on its decision that that transfer would not
injure third-party rights as defined by applicable law.
An important question posed by this proposal is: Which agency would
decide whether a proposed transfer is within the scope and terms of the study?
One option would be to have DWR evaluate the transfer's consistency vel non
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with the study as part of its negotiation of the purchase contracts and
administration of the Water Bank. This option has the virtue of integrated and
expeditious decisionmaking. It suffers, however, from the risk that, as both the
central participant in the Water Bank transfers and the state agency with
principal responsibility for ameliorating future water shortages, DWR might
have an inordinate incentive to resolve close cases in favor of finding an
exemption from Board review. In other words, DWR's duties as manager of the
Water Bank make it the wrong agency to serve as guarantor of third-party rights.
The alternative would be to place the responsibility on the Board. For
all its faults, the Board's statutory charge is to be a neutral regulatory
agency, and its existing authority includes consideration and protection of
fish and wildlife, water quality, and other third-party interests within areasof-origin.283 Thus, the Board would be able to evaluate transfer proposals for
consistency with the study exclusively as a regulator, unencumbered by
potentially conflicting responsibilities for managing both the Water Bank
and the state's water resources generally.
Assignment of this jurisdiction to the Board would require it to devise
expedited procedures for analysis of the proposed Water Bank transfers, so
that the transfers that are consistent with the study could proceed and the
water reallocated swiftly to areas of critical demand. Moreover, the Board
must be able to make the consistency determination without conducting
public hearings and without its decisions being subject to review by the
courts. This necessary limitation on public participation at the time of the
transfer decision means, however, that there must be an alternative forum in
which potentially affected third-parties and other interested members of the
public can comment on and challenge the Board's analysis. The appropriate
occasion for these types of public criticism to be heard is before the drought
emergency occurs. Accordingly, the hydrologic, economic, and ecologic
study should be promulgated as a regulation.
Because rulemaking would implicate the overlapping jurisdiction of
the Board, DWR, and the Department of Fish and Game, these agencies
could participate jointly in the hearings and promulgation of the Water Bank
regulations. Alternatively, the Board or DWR could act as lead agency and
consult with the other two in preparing the study. The state agencies also
should attempt to coordinate their efforts informally, or through cooperative
agreement, with interested federal agencies such as the Bureau of
Reclamation, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, the National
Marine Fisheries Service, and the Environmental Protection Agency.
However the proceedings are conducted, all interested members of the
public would be invited to participate in the hearings and would have an
opportunity to comment on the draft Water Bank rules before they become
final. Individual notice might be provided to those surface water rights
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holders and groundwater users that could be affected by the operations of
the Water Bank as authorized in the regulations. In addition, the final rules
would be subject to judicial review. To ensure that the hydrologic, economic,
and ecologic analyses on which the rule is based remained accurate in light
of changing conditions and new information, the promulgating agencies
should be required to revise the regulations at least every five years.
To accomplish these changes, legislation would be required. Some
transfers that currently are subject to full review by the Board would be
governed by the Water Bank regulations and could qualify instead for
expedited review. Other transfers that presently may be undertaken without
permission of any state agency would be brought within the purview of the
new transfer procedures.284 The protected areas legislation as applicable to
transfers of groundwater would be modified to remove local veto power over
those transfers that are consistent with the Water Bank rules.285 And, for the
first time, the scattered and sporadic statutory protections for third-party
interests would be applicable in a consistent and comprehensive manner to
all transfers associated with the Water Bank.
On the eve of the contract negotiations for the 1991 Water Bank, an
attorney who has been one of the leading exponents of water transfers
lamented: "Every year, transfers get more difficult. You would think they
would get easier but they don't."286 In light of comments such as this, the
prospects of a proposal to create new regulations to govern transfers to
future water banks would appear to be inauspicious. But this brings us to
the third lesson of the 1991 Water Bank: California has entered a new era in
water marketing, the hallmark of which is concern about third-party interests
and community rights. Unless these interests are recognized and protected,
future water banks will be undermined. As Professor Sax has noted, however,
if the protection of third-parties and local communities is available only in
the form of "extensive participation and elaborate public interest
hearings . . . all but the largest water transfers [will be rendered]
uneconomic and untimely."287
In a way, it was fortunate that so few transfers to the 1991 Water Bank
were subject to review for their possible effects on third-party interests. Yet,
we were also lucky that apparently no permanent damage was imposed on
the groundwater basin and overlying land along the Yolo Bypass, on the
fisheries of the Delta and Sacramento River, on wildlife and migratory
waterfowl whose food and habitat was temporarily diminished, and on the
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economic base of the counties from which water was exported.288 It would be
naive to suppose, however, that Yolo County officials, groundwater users,
fish and wildlife advocates, and rural protection groups will sit by and
permit future water transfers to occur without asserting their rights under
the groundwater protection acts, the water transfer statutes, the public trust
doctrine, and that other laws discussed in the article.289
Thus, the fourth lesson of the 1991 Water Bank is that it is not
necessary to live with this type of zero-sum conflict between the goals of
prompt response to drought-related water shortages and recognition of
third-party rights. Circumvention of the laws that have been enacted to
protect third-parties devalues interests that are both economically and
ecologically important and which have a long-standing basis in California
water law.290 Yet, the existing alternatives—formal vetoes of water transfers,
such as that created by AB 2897, or informal vetoes through administrative
delays and litigation—threaten to frustrate the fundamental purpose of the
Emergency Drought Water Bank.
The 1991 Water Bank was a bold experiment that helped the state through
its most recent water crisis with few lasting negative consequences. Part of the
success of the project was the result of creative lawyering and a sensitivity to the
interests that were excluded from the negotiation and implementation of the
transfers that formed the Water Bank. For the future, however, informal
recognition of third-party interests will not suffice. The final lesson on the 1991
Water Bank, then, is that equally bold and innovative legal action is needed to
accommodate both the market and the community.
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